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the efficiency of current systems is also detailed.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the processes surrounding forecast accuracy within the
consumer products organization of Procter and Gamble, P&G.
1.1 Thesis Motivation
Significant excitement exists around shortening and simplifying supply chains, and creating
make-to-order systems. This emphasis of having responsive and flexible supply chains calls into
question the need for forecasts. Whether in discussions with students studying supply chain and
operations, or even global process owners within P&G's organization, a consistent questioning
of the importance of forecasting was evident. The following quote from Sam Ouliaris
exemplifies a common message, "If we could always adjust instantaneously and costlessly to
new conditions there would be no need for forecasts."' My research at P&G indicated that even
as the organization makes major strides in moving towards a more responsive supply chain,
forecast accuracy is still critically important to the business. This thesis will provide sufficient
background to allow readers to obtain a basic understanding of P&G's business and then will
present ideas surrounding the importance of forecast accuracy. The thesis will back up these
ideas with a review of an initiative to drive forecast accuracy accountability, an evaluation of an
investment to improve forecast accuracy, and an analysis of the efficiency of the current demand
planning process. The objective of the thesis is to evaluate the importance of forecast accuracy
to P&G, and provide enough detail to allow readers to apply the lessons to their own
organizations.
1.2 Thesis Overview
Procter and Gamble has a successful history of building and maintaining brand leadership in the
consumer product marketplace. Their success lies not only from excellent management,
innovation and marketing, but from leveraging their size to capture economies of scale. By
driving innovation in finding the most efficient business processes, P&G lowers the cost of
bringing products into the hands of consumers, allowing them to spend more money on activities
such as marketing and product development. In order to continue along this model of success,
integrating supply chains between P&G and the retailers will be necessary to reach the next
breakthrough in efficient supply chains. Additionally, P&G looks inside the organization for
cost savings and process improvement. This thesis introduces P&G, its organization, and supply
chain in Chapter 2. Next, Chapter 3 seeks to assert the importance of forecast accuracy, and the
effects poor forecasting has in the organization. The effects include the cost of inventory, lost
sales from not having product on the shelf, cost of expedited procurement, cost of lost resources
when deploying people and capital assets to projected business growth, and the hit to the stock
1Ouliaris, Sam. "The Art of Forecasting" NUS Business School & Monetary Authority of Singapore,
http://www.ess.org.sg/The%20Art%200f%2OForecasting.ppt# 2 5 6,1,The Art of Forecasting, accessed 3/1/2006.
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price from poor forecasting. These issues are rising in importance, and more attention is being
drawn towards improving forecast accuracy.
Having set the stage for forecast accuracy being very important to business, the remainder of the
thesis evaluates forecast accuracy within the P&G Organization. Chapter 4 introduces the team
at P&G responsible for demand planning, the vocabulary and processes employed, and the
relationship to the rest of the organization. A relatively large organization at P&G, the demand
planning group is well organized and follows standard procedures worldwide to forecast weekly
demand at the SKU level for all of P&G products. Chapter 5 describes the technical details of
the measures P&G employs to assess forecast accuracy.
Understanding the P&G approach to forecasting and measuring accuracy, the next three chapters
outline two internal and one integrated approach to improving forecast accountability, accuracy,
and efficiency. Chapter 6 presents a process for deploying metrics top-down using statistics to
cascade tolerance limits depending on the size, complexity, and capability of organizations. The
development of the process and implementation is discussed. Chapter 7 evaluates the pilot of an
integrated system connecting P&G's customer service system with the customer's distribution
center. Predicted accuracy savings were not realized. The most promising hypothesis seem to
be that the opportunity for applying this system was not as large as originally believed and that
organizational challenges hindered implementation and adoption of new systems in a timely and
cost-effective manner. The system tested in Chapter 7 did show improvements, but at a huge
financial and organizational cost. This introduced the idea of efficiency, and the cost of
improvement, leading into an efficiency study in Chapter 8. Following on a similar study at
Radio Shack 2 , the efficiency of the P&G forecast output was compared against simple statistical
models to evaluate areas for efficiency improvement.
Lastly, an organizational review is presented to demonstrate the importance of P&G's strategy,
politics and culture on corporate efforts. Each of these areas is analyzed and the particular
impact of these areas on the projects is discussed.
2 Harwell, Jack and Michael Gilliland. "Applying Forecast Value Added at Radio Shack." Conference Presentation
at the Institute of Business Forecasting Supply Chain Forecasting Conference, Phoenix, AZ, March 1, 2005.
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2 Procter and Gamble: The world's greatest consumer
product company
This chapter provides an introduction to Procter and Gamble, setting the background for the
thesis. Clearly stated in the 2005 Annual Report, the vision of P&G is:3
"Be, and be recognized as, the best consumer products and services company in
the world.
Our Promise: Two billion times a day, P&G brands touch the lives of people
around the world. P&G people work to make sure those brands live up to their
promise to make everyday life just a little bit better.
Touching lives, improving life. P&G."
While leaving a heart-warming feeling, these words do not speak to the fundamental
statistics and strategy which allow for P&G to fulfill the vision expressed.
2.1 History
Formed as a soap and candle business by two brothers-in-law in 1837, P&G had a humble
beginning. Surviving difficult market conditions and the civil war, the company grew to a multi-
million dollar corporation by 1890. At the same time, P&G built one of the first product
research labs in America. This investment into research led to the development of new products
including soap for clothes and dishes, and Crisco, the first all-vegetable shortening. In 1920,
P&G chose to sell directly to retailers avoiding the uneven production needs from dealing with
wholesalers, changing the way the grocery trade would operate. 4
Throughout the 1930s and 40s, Procter and Gamble expanded into beauty products, shampoo,
and toilet goods. At the same time, P&G developed a system for brand management and began
advertising on both radio, and eventually TV. In fact, the sponsorship of radio programs by
P&G's soap powder led to the term, "soap opera" to be used for these popular radio programs.
Even in these early days, P&G advertising and sponsorship was invading US households. P&G
also started early with international expansion, and in 1935 P&G acquired Philippine
Manufacturing Company, the first operations in the Far East.3
In 1946, the introduction of Tide laundry detergent proved so successful that it funded new
growth into other product lines and other markets. Between 1946 and 1980, P&G would expand
into new products including Crest toothpaste, toilet tissue and paper towel, Pampers disposable
diapers, Pringles potato chips, Folger's coffee and Downy fabric softener. P&G also expanded
3 P&G Annual Report 2005.
4 "A Company History" P&G, 2005
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geographically starting on-the-ground operations in Mexico, Europe and Japan. By 1980 P&G
was doing business in 23 countries around the world with sales of over $10 billion.
Throughout the last two and a half decades, P&G has continued to expand into new product
markets including health care and cosmetics, as well as geographic markets as it now sells its
products in over 160 countries worldwide.
2.2 Key Competitive Advantages
P&G publicizes that its core strengths lie in four main areas: branding, innovation, go-to-market,
and scale. 6 These core strengths lead to a competitive advantage in the market place.
2.2.1 Branding
Known for marketing expertise, especially their frequently copied methodology of "brand
management," P&G has over three hundred brands. P&G prides itself on building large brands
which are hugely popular globally. P&G introduced the concept of "billion dollar brands"
referring to brands which independently generates over $1 billion dollars in sales each year.
P&G has 17 brands in this category in 2005, and with the acquisition of Gillette, will add another
5 brands anticipating 22 brands in 2006. Some of these brands are quite huge. Pampers alone
generates over $6 billion in sales each year. Another favorite, Tide, generates $3 billion.
Figure 2.1 Billion-Dollar Brands6
Having twenty-two brands each selling over a billion dollars in sales each year may seem
impressive. But the pipeline is also exceptional, and P&G has another thirteen brands with sales
of over $500 million in the pipeline. Each of these is capable of crossing the billion-dollar mark
in the next several years.
5 "A Company History" P&G, 2005
6 P&G Annual Report 2005.
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2.2.2 Innovation
P&G's size, resources and history allows P&G to have massive repositories of consumer and
market knowledge spanning the globe and decades of transactions. P&G leverages this
knowledge, along with science and engineering expertise to continually innovate both products
and processes. P&G has collected consumer data from more than 100 million consumers across
30 countries and 20 categories of business. Additionally, P&G invests nearly $2 billion a year in
research and development, more than most of their direct competitors combined. This
knowledge and commitment to investment drives P&G innovation and brand building and
strengthens the value provided to both retail partners and consumers.7
2.2.3 Go-to-market
P&G can leverage its knowledge, size and expertise to developing strong relationships to bring
products to consumers through the retail channel. P&G provides retailers with consumer and
shopper research, supply chain solutions, branding and marketing expertise, and more. In a
recent industry survey of U.S. retailers, P&G was ranked #1 in six of eight categories: clearest
strategy, most innovative, most helpful consumer and shopper information, best supply chain
management, best category management, and best consumer marketing. 7
2.2.4 Scale
With $56 billion dollars in annual sales, not including a recent acquisition of Gillette which adds
another $10 billion in annual sales, P&G is one of the world's largest consumer products
organizations. With over 100,000 employees operating in over 80 countries, the large
organization can function with significant economies of scale P&G both creates and capture
value from its massive size in areas such as purchasing, distribution, and business services at the
company level.7
2.3 Moments of Truth
P&G's CEO, AG Lafley, has created a vision of two moments of truth in which P&G needs to
win to be successful. This vision has energized the organization and focused people on two core
ideas. The first moment of truth occurs in the store, when the marketing, pricing, and availability
of a product entice a consumer to purchase it. The second moment of truth occurs when the
consumer uses the product, and is pleased with the quality enough to become a repeat user.
2.4 Organization
P&G also implemented an organizational change to setup a structure around these two moments
of truth, which would provide the ability to integrate new businesses while continuing to build
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006
7 P&G Annual Report 2005.
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existing businesses. P&G is divided into three major areas: Global Business Units (GBU),
Market Development Organizations (MDO), and Global Business Services (GBS). The main
idea is to capture the benefits of focused smaller companies through dedicated GBUs while
capturing the go-to-market strengths and capabilities of a $50 billion company through local
market development organizations. Lastly, shared business services organization and lean
corporate functions groups ensure P&G's functional disciplines will continue to lead the
industry. 8
Global Business Units manage the profit and loss for brands globally. They develop and
implement long-term strategies for P&G brands. Operating globally, they can leverage deep
consumer understanding to determine common consumer needs and quickly expand brands and
product innovations to different markets around the world. GBUs are measured on shareholder
return and their development of strong market leadership positions in their individual industries.
The GBUs include functions such as global marketing, product development, and product supply.
P&G divides its businesses into three main GBUs: Beauty Care, Household, and Health, Baby
and Family Care. The GBU is focused on winning the "second moment of truth" - when the
consumer uses the product and evaluates how well the product meets their expectations - by
focusing on delivering superior products, packaging and marketing.
Market Development Organizations are responsible for understanding local needs and leveraging
their scale in distributing to customers in local regions. MDOs are responsible for the entire
portfolio of brands in a particular geography, and this breadth provides flexibility to serve the
needs for local retailers. These regional MDOs can focus on the customers, retailers, supply
chains and governments associated with local markets. Essentially functioning like a sales and
customer service organization, they are aligned behind top-line growth, market share, cash, cost,
and value-creation objectives. The key advantage of this structure is that MDOs can focus 100%
of their resources on local consumers and customers without duplicating product innovation,
product sourcing, brand advertising or other activities that are led by the Global Business Units.
This eliminates inefficient overlaps and frees up resources to collaborate better with customers
and focus exclusively on winning in local markets. Thus, the MDO is focused on winning the
"first moment of truth" - when a consumer stands in front of the shelf and chooses a product
from among many competitive offerings.
Each of the Global Business Units is headed by a vice-chairman reporting to the chief executive
officer of the company. All of the MDOs also report to the Vice-Chairman of Operations. Thus
employees within the GBU or MDO do not officially connect in the organization until reaching
the CEO level.
Global Business Services, the third major organization, operates as the "back office" for the
GBU and MDO organizations, providing world-class technology, processes and standard data
tools to understand the business and serve consumers and customers better. This organization
includes functions such as accounting, IT and human resources.
Two other smaller corporate organizations also exist at P&G: Global MDO and Corporate
Functions. Corporate functions operate across the GBUs for functions typically conducted
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006
8 P&G 2004 Annual Report.
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within the GBU. These functional organizations include marketing, finance, and product supply.
They support the GBUs ensuring functional discipline and installing industry best practices.
Likewise, the Global MDO supports functions which occur across the different regional MDOs,
such as sales, physical distribution, and demand planning.
2.5 Customer versus Consumer
There is an important distinction between the term customer and consumer. P&G uses
'customer' to refer to the retailers, primarily mass merchandisers, grocery stores, membership
club stores and drug stores that purchase products from P&G. The term 'consumer' refers to the
person who purchases the product and uses it in the household. So while P&G works to improve
relationships with their customers to reduce costs and improve service, the purpose statement of
P&G stresses the importance of the consumer:
"We will provide branded products and services of superior quality and value that
improve the lives of the world's consumers."
In order to provide superior quality and value to today's demanding, diverse and changing
marketplace, each brand maintains a significant amount of variety and is constantly refreshing
the product portfolio and to add new products. This adds complexity to the relationships with
customers, a critical part of the supply chain.
2.6 Supply Chain: Scope, complexity and magnitude
The supply chain refers to the network of suppliers, manufacturing plants, distributors, and
retailers that participate in the sale, delivery and production of a particular product. The
emphasis on the first moment of truth indicates the importance of P&G's supply chain in
ensuring the product is on the shelf at the retailer and able to be sold.
P&G has a large supply organization, operating over 100 manufacturing plants, prior to the
Gillette acquisition, and engaging in numerous contract manufacturing relationships.9 P&G also
has its own distribution network, in addition to that of its customers. Selling over 50,000
products to mass merchandisers, grocery stores, and drug stores worldwide, P&G products can
be purchased from a huge number of retailers worldwide. This supply chain is depicted below.
9 P&G leaders, including Richard Clark, Mark Kremblewski and Jim Yuhas, provided much of the background
about the company and its supply chain.
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Suppliers P&G - Mfg P&G - DC Customer DC StorefShelf Consumption
Figure 2.2 P&G Supply Chain' 0
This picture shows the many components in the channel between manufacturing the product and
finally getting the product into hands of the consumer. The breadth and size of P&G further
complicate the system. Strong differences occur between businesses and regions. For example,
the relative importance of customers varies significantly by region. Over 30% of the sales
volume passes through Wal-Mart in North America. However, in Western Europe there are
more relatively equivalent retailers responsible for selling to consumers. One example can be
used to highlight both the importance of Wal-Mart, and supply chain policies such as inventory
management. Inventory reductions at Wal-Mart are cited by the Dow Jones Newswires as
triggering the forecast update at P&G, which caused the stock price to fall 2.3%.1"
The size and scope of P&G's product variety also complicates the supply chain. First, from a
size perspective, P&G operates sixty Sales and Operations Planning (S&OP) processes around
the globe each month. S&OP refers to process where various departments within P&G come
together to convert the business plan into an operating plan, balancing and determining the
appropriate demand and supply plans. There is also significant variety with the supply processes
for different P&G businesses. For example, some businesses are quite responsive and have the
flexibility to change the schedule of what they plan to make a few hours before it is actually
produced. These same businesses execute the planning and scheduling processes multiple times
a day. On the other hand, some businesses plan production weeks in advance, and fix the
schedule a month out, leaving little flexibility for last minute changes. In this wide variety of
business environments, the importance of forecast accuracy begins to unfold.
1 Cheung, Christine. "A Short-range Forecasting and Inventory Strategy for New Product Launches." MIT Thesis.
2005.
" Lloyd, Mary Ellen. "Procter & Gamble Down After Tempering E Europe, Asia Outlook" Dow Jones Newswire.
March 14, 2006.
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3 Importance of Forecast Accuracy
This chapter will analyze the importance of forecast accuracy and the direct impacts it has on the
organization. The forecast enables the first moment of truth - having the product available on
the shelf.
3.1 Inventory Levels
Many supply chain and operations textbooks and journal articles discuss the direct relationship
between forecast error and inventory levels. With perfect accuracy, and instantaneous capacity,
no inventory would be required in the system as companies could plan to make the right quantity
of equipment exactly at the right time. However, it is not feasible that companies would have
infinite instantaneous capacity. Thus, even if the forecast accuracy is perfect, inventory will be
required to ensure that demand can be met. This is referred to as process tock, pipeline stock, or
WIP. Once forecast error is introduced, safety stock inventory rises to manage the variability in
demand. The ownership of inventory ties corporate dollars which could have been invested
otherwise. Thus, over-predicting sales can lead to excess costly inventory levels. It can also
lead to costs of inventorying the material, warehouse, handling and management costs.
Additionally, as this unpredictability of demand amplifies finished product inventory, it can pass
through to raw material inventory safety stock, requiring higher levels in this category as well.
Finally, excess inventory created from poor forecasting may not be able to be sold at all, with the
rapid product life cycle occurring for many consumer goods. P&G refers to this inventory as
remnants, excess inventory without any plans to sell.
3.2 Customer Service
The relationship between forecast accuracy, inventory, and instantaneous capacity demonstrates
how having additional inventory or capacity protects against forecast error. However, if the
inventory is carried in the wrong product, a consumer may find the shelf empty of his or her
favorite variety. This refers to another factor impacted by forecast accuracy, customer service.
Customer service refers to the availability of goods for sale on the shelf. Under-predicting sales
can lead to supply shortages resulting in empty shelves in the store. This would result in a
failure at the first moment of truth as a customer can not find the particular product that they
desire. Thus, this can result in lost sales to the customer. This is not always a major issue.
Sometimes a customer will wait until the material is in stock, purchase a similar SKU still from
P&G, or travel to a different store that does have the SKU in stock. However, there is a risk of
devastating long term effects on profitability if the customer were to purchase a competitors
product and cease being a repeat user of P&G's product, and switch to the competitor's product.
This lost revenue can extend for long periods of time and be exceptionally costly to the business.
Therefore P&G strives to have a high level of customer service, keeping product on the shelf
Other mechanisms can be used to minimize out-of-stock occurrences on the shelf, for example,
rush shipping of product. But this premium freight is also expensive and reduces the overall
profits of the enterprise.
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3.3 Procurement Costs
The impact of poor forecasting on inventory levels stretches beyond finished product to raw
materials. It can also be felt in many other procurement areas, including the expedition costs of
rushing material, in the demurrage cost of not being able to offload excess material, in
negotiating future vendor relationships and in lining up adequate supply in the future. For
example, one plant listed detention and demurrage costs in excess of $10,000 per week. Under-
forecasting raw material requirements can lead to a shortage of material, forcing a shipment to a
customer to go with fewer cases than requested. This would not be reflected in forecast error, as
the forecast is compared with actual shipments, and not customer demand. Additionally, raw
material shortages can lead to unplanned downtime as equipment is wasted without being able to
make product. To provide an example of the magnitude of potential savings in this area, one of
the P&G manufacturing plants spends in excess of one billion dollars per year on raw material
cost. If the forecast accuracy could be improved, and thus the variability reduced, a significant
percentage of raw materials, and thus cash, could be freed up for better ventures.
3.4 Business Planning
Not only does forecast error have a direct impact on the daily inventory and costs, and product
sales, it also impacts longer term decision making. Forecast accuracy is important to driving big
business decisions and can impact pricing decisions, timing of new product introductions, and
investment decisions for the allocation of resources between R&D, sales, and marketing. For
example, some businesses carry extra capital assets to be able to deliver instantaneous capacity,
where these investments could be avoided if better forecasting were available. Even when
business budgets are allocated to new product development and the introduction of a new
product, P&G customer service managers give examples of how development production has
been required to shift to actual production for immediate sale, delaying initiative timing of new
products. Capital investment, R&D investment, and marketing budgets decisions hinge on
appropriate forecasts.
3.5 Sales Projections to Financial Analysts
Lastly, the course of work at P&G highlighted the importance of accurate forecasts in areas
beyond sales and demand. Forecast accuracy is important for building credibility on Wall Street
and protecting the company's stock price. Many journal articles discuss the relationship between
earnings forecasts and stock performance. Copeland writes:
"Changes in noise, measured by changes in the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of
earnings, have a significant negative correlation with total return to shareholders. If the
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company can decrease "noise"--that is, the dispersion of expectations across analysts
and investor forecasts - then its share price should increase."12
This essentially asserts that forecast error reduces the stock price, and improving accuracy should
improve the stock price. One article expresses how superior forecasting has a great impact on
stock prices. 13 Another interesting article studied how since investors reward firms that meet or
exceed earnings expectations, executives of firms with sizable option components in their
compensation plans have increased incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed analysts'
forecasts.1 4 It further went on to investigate the correlation between options granting and a
history of exceeded expectations. This last article touches upon the management motivation for
introducing forecast bias to ensure that forecasts are always met. This bias can be difficult to
impossible to remove from the system under the current policies. However, in light of the fact
that error has a strong effect on stock price, it is evident that improvements in forecast accuracy
are better for the shareholders.
12 Copeland, Tom, Aaron Dolgoff, and Alberto Moel. "The Role of Expectations in Explaining the Cross-Section of
Stock Returns" Review of Accounting Studies. 9, 149-188, 2004
13 Park, Chul W. and Earl K. Stice. "Analyst Forecasting Ability and the Stock Price Reaction to Forecast
Revisions" Review of Accounting Studies. 5, 259-272 (2000)
" Bauman, Mark P and Kenneth W. Shaw. "Stock option compensation and the likelihood of meeting analysts'
quarterly earnings targets." Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. (2006) 26: 301-319
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4 Demand Planning
Forecast accuracy hinges on the demand planning organization, whose objective is to generate
volume forecasts which are timely, unbiased, and reasonable. The organization operates at an
intersection of two of the major organizations within P&G.
4.1 Organizational Structure
As described earlier, the majority of P&G employees work in one of the three major
organizations: GBUs, MDOs, or GBS. Global Business Services (GBS), which includes groups
such as information technology, are not relevant to most of this thesis. The demand planners
operate at an interesting bridge in the organization between the other two major groups. The
three Global Business Units have responsibility for product supply - which includes every phase
from product development, procurement, manufacturing plants and their processes. Therefore
the GBU essentially owns creating and maintaining the inventory for the corporation. The
Market Development Organizations are regional groups which operate across the business units
and align with customers, thus coordinating sales, promotions, shipments, and customer service
across the different business units. The demand planners fall within the MDO organizations and
are responsible for collecting the input from the respective parties and generating the sales
forecast which is then used by the business to determine how much product to make and when to
make it.
As this is a fairly involved role for a large consumer products company like P&G, demand
planning is quite a sizeable organization. There are over five hundred demand planners
throughout the P&G organization. This is believed to be one of the largest demand planning
organizations. While demand planners reside within the MDO and report through that
organization, they are aligned with GBUs. For example, although the MDO is not divided by
brands, the demand planners within the MDOs are. With the large breadth of P&G businesses
and the number of general managers representing various countries, brands and profit centers,
these planners are required handle a large volume and breadth of situations.
Turnover is another interesting consideration. There are approximately 200 new planners
turning over in the role each year. Many people leave this role for other positions within P&G,
thus training is a high priority of the organization, and consistent processes are necessary for
bringing new people up to speed quickly. To retain knowledge, enable standard process
maintenance and improvement, a Global Demand Planning organization exists. This
organization has regional leads which support the planners within their regions, as well as global
experts focusing on improving the processes. This work was conducted from the global demand
planning organization, though funded by the product supply corporate function group.
4.2 Demand Plan Terminology
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When discussing forecast accuracy, certain terms will be used repeatedly. Below, the common
terms used by P&G will be presented and used subsequently in this thesis.
4.2.1 Horizon, weeks-out
The horizon refers to the time period between when the forecast is generated, and when the
shipments are expected to occur. Horizon is synonymous with weeks-out. A one-week-out
horizon indicates that the forecast was generated one-week before the shipment was expected to
occur. The horizon is often expressed as month-n, where n is the horizon. When creating a
forecast for the month of September in July, the P&G convention is to call this horizon month-1,
indicating that the forecast was generated a full month ahead. A forecast for sales in September
generated in August, would be referred to as having a horizon of month-0. This can be a source
of confusion, as different groups within P&G use different rules for the zero period.
4.2.2 Time bucket
The phrase, "time bucket" is used to refer to the period of time for which the forecast and
shipments are aggregated. For example, within P&G the most common time buckets are weeks
and months. A weekly time bucket indicates that the forecast is generated for a seven-day period,
thus alleviating any concern on which day within a week the shipment will occur. This weekly
forecast will be compared with the shipment total for that week. Monthly time buckets are often
used for evaluating business forecast accuracy. Essentially the forecast generated for a month
will be compared with the month's shipments.
4.2.3 Aggregation
Aggregation refers to combining together different units to represent a broader perspective. For
example, demand for different fragrances of deodorant may be aggregated together to represent
an aggregated demand for deodorant. Aggregation may occur across products, across businesses,
even across time. Many logistics and supply chain experts indicate that aggregate forecasts are
more accurate than individual forecasts. Yossi Sheffi gives the example of how Cadillac
aggregated demand across its Florida dealers, instead of forecasting each dealer individually.
This resulted in much higher accuracy and improved customer service."
4.2.4 Product hierarchy
Different levels of the organization will refer to different levels of products. For example, the
stock keeping unit, or SKU, is the lowest level of the hierarchy and refers to a unit that is sold of
a product. Sometimes P&G will replace one SKU number with a new SKU number when the
image on the packaging changes, although it is the same product in the same quantity. In this
case, to ease the transition between the two numbers, though different SKUs, the term, demand
forecast unit, or dfu, is used to refer to the level above SKU referring to the size for which a
product is forecast. Above this, products are aggregated according to similarities. The hierarchy
varies based on the product, but an example is shown in the figure below:
15 Sheffi,,Yossi. "A Demand for Steady Supply" Financial Times. August 22, 2005.
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PRODUCT HIERARCHY
Category: Fabric Care
3.
Brand: Tide
Packaging: Bottle
Fragrance: Clean Breeze
Sku: Tide Clean Breeze Liquid, 100 oz
Figure 4.1 Sample of Product Hierarchy
As shown in Figure 4.1, Tide, Era, Gain, Cheer, and Ivory Snow are all P&G brands of laundry
detergent. Combining the concepts of aggregation, predicting the monthly sales of the laundry
category is easier than predicting a particular brand. Once inside the liquid form of the Tide
brand, it is more difficult to predict whether a customer will stick with Mountain Spring Tide, or
switch to April Fresh. Lastly, the largest amount of forecast error would occur for the SKU,
which defines the unit sold. Thus, as you move up the product hierarchy, products are
aggregated together according to common features, and the forecast also tends to become more
accurate.
4.2.5 Events
The term "event" refers to different instances which represent a deviation from normal day-to-
day business operations. Events can have a large impact on demand, and are thus critical to the
forecast. Different types of events include merchandising, price changes, new item introductions,
planogram or distribution changes. Merchandising refers to special efforts to encourage sales of
an existing product, such as a special advertising campaign, end-of-aisle display or other shelf
arrangement, brochures, or perhaps coupons. When a new price is rolled out for an existing
product line, the purchasing behavior from the customer can be impacted. For example,
customers may over-order in advance of a price increase. New item introductions are difficult to
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forecast as explained by the thesis of the previous P&G intern. 16 A 'planogram' is a graphic
diagram showing how and where specific retail products should be placed on retail shelves or
displays. Changes in the customer stores can have a large impact on product sales.
4.3 Planning Processes
This section will explain the process used by demand planning, building upon the terminology
discussed previously. The over five hundred demand planners execute a weekly process where
they generate a SKU-level forecast, in weekly buckets, for every week for a period of years.
This process employs historical data, user input, and the use of a statistical forecasting tool
which incorporates many of the important inputs to determining a forecast.
4.3.1 Factors Influencing Demand
The factors coming together in the statistical forecasting tool are demonstrated in the following
diagram excerpted from P&G's Demand Planning Global Process Owner, Richard Clark.
Company Plans
Promotions
Advertising
Sampling
Initiative s
Pipelines
I Pricing
Master Data
Sales Forecast by product, location, period
Orders & Shipments Forecasting .Tool For sales, manufacturing, finance, etc.
Incorporate Six C's
Customers
Consumers
Competition
Consumption
Customization
Cannibalization
Figure 4.2 Inputs to the Sales Forecasting Tool "
16 Cheung, Christine. "A Short-range Forecasting and Inventory Strategy for New Product Launches." MIT Thesis.
2005.
" Clark, Richard A. "Demand Planning Overview: Key Elements of P&G's Global Demand Planning Process."
Internal P&G Documentation. December 9, 2004.
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Figure 4.2 depicts the demand planner's use of the sales forecasting tool to generate forecasts.
The sales forecast tool takes historical data, including years of shipment history, along with
future orders as the base data. Additionally, master data is recorded around the size of shipping
quantities, choice of forecast models, and the parameters used. The list of company plans are
also important to consider. Promotions typically refer to discounts passed through to customers
to encourage buying within a certain time window due to a reduced cost. Advertising can be
accomplished through multiple media, and is intended to have an impact on sales. Many studies
evaluate consumers and competitors response to changes in advertising and promotion.18
Distributing of product samples, launching of new initiatives and the time and quantity to fill a
new product pipeline, along with fundamental pricing changes all reflect P&G decisions which
have an impact on the forecast. Additionally, the external "C's" have an impact on the sales
forecast. Customers who control the channel through which the products are sold make
independent decisions with regard to their advertising, promotions, store placement which
impact sales. Consumer tastes and preferences continually change and impact demand. Direct
competition can be beneficial by increasing the awareness of a market, or can steal demand by
attracting customers away whether based on quality or cost. Previous history of consumption is
important, as with consumer goods, the inventory that the average consumer has will impact
buying patterns. For example, when consumers run out of toilet paper at home, they are likely to
purchase another roll, regardless of price. However, if they have recently purchased a mass
merchandiser case of 100 rolls, they are unlikely to purchase even more regardless of the
promotion offered. Lastly, P&G can cannibalize their own products as they have multiple brands
which serve the same marketplace.
4.3.2 Statistical Forecast
The first step in the demand planning process is to develop the statistical forecast. The demand
planner is responsible for evaluating, selecting, maintaining and updating the forecast model
which predicts sales based on historical data and model parameters. The model parameters are
set based on a review of historical data, assumptions about market behavior, and an evaluation of
how well different models perform at predicting future demand. The statistical forecast is the
output of the computerized sales forecasting tool which predicts demand by demand forecast unit,
in most cases the SKU, by week for an extended period of time.
4.3.3 Independent Net Forecast
With the statistical forecast, the demand planner classifies the SKUs according to their historical
demand profile. For each supply chain, focus is placed on those which have the most impact on
overall shipment variation and forecast error for the category. The demand planner meets with
organizations such as the marketing and sales functions to collect intelligence on special causes
which might impact demand. The planner uses historical data to determine what manual forecast
adjustments are warranted from the information. This generates the "independent net forecast,"
the final forecast which is communicated to the organizations within P&G.
18 Ailawadi, Kusum L., Donald R. Lehmann, and Scott A. Neslin. "Market Response to a Major Policy Change in
the Marketing Mix: Learning from Procter & Gamble's Value Pricing Strategy" Journal of Marketing, 65, 44-61,
2001.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 25 of 103
4.4 Relationship to Organization
Demand planning requires significant interaction with the other organizations at P&G.
Organizational motivations can have an impact on the forecast. In some markets, regional sales
input might be inclined to over-forecast demand to ensure that product is available and no
shortages occur. Since inventory is owned by the GBU, not the MDO, there is no penalty for the
MDO if excess material is not able to be sold. In a softening business, market representatives
may encourage planners to keep demand high to justify additional spending. Thus much of the
work of the demand planner is to drive out bias introduced by organizational motivations. Much
of the success of the demand planner comes from managing by influence.
The output of the demand planning process is a forecast by SKU, for a group of customers, for a
weekly bucket by region. In order to transform this forecast into more detailed demand plan
which can be used for site integrated planning, split tables are maintained which maintain fixed
percentages for materials and the manufacturing plants. For example, if two plants, A and B,
both make a certain SKU of Tide, the table maintains a data record for Tide indicating that 30%
will be manufactured in plant A and 70% will be manufactured in plant B. These tables are also
maintained for the days of the week, keeping fixed percentages for each day, based on material.
The demand planning organization essentially presents a volume forecast to a particular product,
split according to groups of customers. However, it is the product supply organization, which
lies within the GBUs, that takes the forecast and translates it into a plan detailing exactly when
and what each plant will make. This group also maintains the inventory levels and is responsible
for procuring raw materials. Thus the impacts of the good or bad forecast are typically not felt
by the planning organization, but by another branch of P&G.
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5 Measuring Forecast Accuracy
It is clear that demand planning plays an important, yet complicated role in the organization.
Thus, measuring forecast accuracy is critical not only for analyzing the performance of the
forecast process, but also for determining how to properly design the rest of the organizational
processes to deal with this uncertainty. For example, inventory levels and customer service are
directly impacted by the forecast error. This section will introduce the main areas of forecast
accuracy used at P&G.
5.1 Forecast Error Index
A simple index is commonly used to review forecast error at P&G. The index is simply a ratio
of the actual sales, as measured by shipment volume to the sales forecast for that period. This is
shown as follows:
Forecast Error Index: Actual Sales/Forecast * 100
This simple ratio is represented as a percent, so that a value of 100 indicates that the sales
matched the forecast, and a number over 100, indicates that the sales exceeded the expectations.
Whereas a number below 100 indicates that sales did not meet the forecast. This not only gives
an indication of the size of the error (the difference from 100), but also a visible measure of the
bias, which is the tendency to over, or under-forecast demand.
5.2 Bias
Silver, Pyke and Peterson indicate that the term bias is used to indicate that on average a forecast
is substantially above or below actual demand.19 Bias is commonly indicated by evaluating a
period of forecast error indices to determine if over an extended period of time, the errors lie
heavier on one side of 100. It can be also evaluated using probabilities, to be explained later.
Common perception is that bias can be removed by making a model correction, or by
management intervention.
5.3 WAPE: Weighted-Absolute Percent Error
The global standard definition that P&G uses for forecast error is WAPE, weighted-absolute
percent error.20 P&G defines a process for calculating this factor, aggregating it up through the
19 Silver, Edward A., David F Pyke, and Rein Peterson. Inventory Management and Production Planning and
Scheduling. 3rd Ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1998.
2 Kremblewski, Mark. "Supply Chain Forecast Error: Global Standard Definition" P&G Internal Documentation.
March 2005
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organization and handling exception cases. This is detailed below based on training provided by
Mark Kremblewski, Global Demand Planning Business Expert.
Supply Chain Error is based on a weekly measure of Absolute Percent Error (APE) by Demand
Forecasting Unit (DFU) by Market:
APE = Absolute (Shipment-Forecast)/Forecast x 100%
When determining the forecast for a period of time, the appropriate 'lead-time' or 'time fence'
between when the forecast was created and when the shipment occurred is left to the discretion
of the demand planner but should in general reflect the 'supply chain cumulative lead time' for
that DFU. For simplicity, entire brands, categories or even countries may use the same average
lead-time.
Results are reported in a monthly aggregate. Aggregation is volume weighted based on shipping
volume. DFU APE's are volume weighed, based on shipped, not forecast volume, horizontally
across the month: this is the WAPE for a DFU for that month DFU. Additionally, APE's are
volume weighed (based on shipped volume) vertically to the Brand: this is the WAPE for a
Brand for that month. All further aggregations (to country, category, GBU, MDO, Global etc.)
are all done on a shipped volume weighted basis.
W | Kshipment, -forecast,, I
-Ishipment, x-
WAE n ,= forecast,_ -_XO
Zshipment,
t=1
Standards are applied to other circumstances to ensure uniformity across P&G. For a DFU/week
with a positive forecast but 0 (zero) shipments, APE should indicate 100%. This will not affect
the Brand total WAPE since the volume weight of that data point is null (zero). For a DFU/week
with a positive Forecast but <0 (negative) shipments, the APE will show a real calculated value.
The weighting calculation will use the absolute value of the negative shipment. This may occur
if product returns in a given period exceed shipments. Thus the error will affect the WAPE
result in the correct direction. (If the negative were to be used in the weighing, this DFU/Week
data point would serve to actually reduce the overall WAPE result). For a DFU/week with a 0
(zero) forecast and positive shipments, the APE calculation fails due to the divide by zero term,
therefore these instances need to be excluded from the calculation. As these data points are
excluded completely from aggregate calculations, removing them also essentially detracts from
the actual volume shipped term of the equation. If the actual shipment is zero, even if there is a
forecast, the data point will essentially be excluded as the weighting applied will be zero. This is
summarized in the following table:
Forecast Actual Data point Weighted Roll Up
shipment shows
Real Real XX% Included
Real 0 100% Not included due to 0 weighting
Real < 0 XX% Absolute value of the Actual is used
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for weighting (increases WAPE)
0 Real, 0, <0 Div/0 or NA Excluded
Additionally, in some cases if the forecast is close to zero, but a large shipment occurs, the error
may become huge. Therefore P&G specifies a cap of 1000% for individual APE data points.
This occurs when a very large shipment occurs (as in the shipment of a remnant) for a very small
forecast. In severe situations, these data points can make an entire country or region's WAPE
result meaningless.
5.4 MAPE, Mean-Absolute Percent Error
The mean absolute percent error, MAPE follows identical rules to WAPE, however, it is not
weighted based on the shipment volume, and is instead averaged across the data set, giving equal
weight to each data point. Silver, Pyke and Peterson present MAPE as another intuitive measure
of forecast error.21 Essentially, it measures the absolute percent error for each of the data points,
and takes an un-weighted average across the data points, and then represents it as a percent error
as shown below:
= K |shipment, -forecast,-, jx100
n ,aj forecast,_1
It is important to note that MAPE is not appropriate if demand values are very low. For example,
a forecast of one unit of demand matched with an actual value of two units shows an error of 100
percent.
5.5 Probability
Another measure that has been commonly adopted at P&G is a probability. Managers easily
understand a percent of how likely a behavior is to happen. Therefore probability is frequently
used to evaluate bias, and indicate how likely an organization is to have a forecast that is over
100% versus a forecast that is under 100% - when measured by the forecast error index. The
probability that a forecast will be under 100 is determined by evaluating a normally distributed
curve with a mean and standard deviation determined from the forecast error index data. The
probability that a forecast will be over 100 can be determined by determining the difference from
one. P&G strives for a forecast which is 50% likely to be over and under 100.
21 Silver, Edward A., David F Pyke, and Rein Peterson. Inventory Management and Production Planning and
Scheduling. 3rd Ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1998.
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6 Enabling Accountability for Forecast Accuracy
Previous chapters demonstrated the importance of forecast accuracy, and also discussed the
general organizational structure at P&G. While there are a number of resources dedicated to
demand planning, this organization is not functionally close with the supply organization which
uses the forecast generated from demand planning. While the supply process and manufacturing
resides in the GBUs (Global Business Units), demand planning resides with the MDOs (Market
Development Organizations). So while many functions may point to the demand planning
process as contributing to issues, they do not have responsibility over the department. This
becomes quite interesting when the MDO is responsible for budgeting the resources dedicated to
forecasting, while it is the GBUs that are most impacted by the quality of the forecasts generated.
This chapter details a process P&G employed to create accountability for forecast accuracy
across the organization. Using a top-down metric driven approach, targets have been set for the
company as a whole, and a process has been developed to disaggregate a metric into appropriate
targets for sub-components, allowing managers to further demand accountability from within
their organizations.
6.1 Motivation for Statistical Accountability Process
Forecast accuracy is critically important to P&G, as inaccuracy can have a direct impact on the
stock price. P&G publishes quarterly statements, which indicate the sales revenue (in dollars)
for the quarter. If these revenues exceed expectations, the stock price typically rises. If these
revenues fall short of expectations, the stock price falls. Therefore the ability to accurately
predict and manage future sales is critically important to the evaluation of the company.
When talking about the forecast generated for P&G as a whole, typically this is discussed in
terms of dollars sold, instead of units sold. However, predicting quarterly profit is difficult as the
contributing factors fluctuate with time. These factors include the mix of products sold, the cost
to manufacture, distribute and sell these products, and the price achieved for each of these
products. One of the challenges discussed is whether businesses generate the volume forecast of
the units that will be sold, and then use this to drive the financial forecast (dollars of revenue), or
whether businesses set the revenue (dollar) target, and then back calculate the volume forecast
(units to sell).
In a move to create more accountability, accuracy, and clarity in the system, P&G has recently
moved to use the S&OP Process (Sales and Operations Planning) to have all of the relevant
parties represented at a routine meeting to generate the appropriate volume forecasts for
businesses. This S&OP process should generate the volume forecast, which should be the basis
for the financial forecast. As Finance has a seat in the S&OP process, their opinions should be
represented at this earlier point in the process, and the most realistic and accurate forecast should
be generated.
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With this new emphasis on generating accurate forecasts through the S&OP Process, a project
was created to generate corporate accountability for accurate forecasts. Historically, P&G has
set a certain tolerance range for each of the business regions and units, and the same range was
used for each entity, regardless of the size or complexity or the business region or unit. With this
seemingly arbitrary metric setting policy, these metrics were frequently missed, and managers
did not buy into their importance. The main objective was to set a global metric for forecast
accuracy for P&G as a whole entity, then develop a process for disaggregating the metric as
aligned with business units.
6.2 Setting a Global Metric
Historically, P&G had measured its accuracy as a ratio of the shipments over the forecast,
expressed as a percentage. Thus if the percent was over 100, then there were more shipments
than forecast. A single percentage point deviation was associated with millions of dollars of
sales either over or under forecast. To encourage high forecast accuracy, P&G had historically
operated by setting a global tolerance where the shipment/forecast ratio needed to be within a set
tolerance. However, their ability to deliver within this tolerance was questionable, and the first
area to be discussed.
6.2.1 Historical evaluation of P&G performance
The basis of this proposal for creating accountability for forecast accuracy hinged on selecting a
global metric which was both realistic, yet a stretch target. Senior leadership wanted a tight
tolerance range, which would demand better forecasts. However, I worked with P&G's Global
Analytics departments to investigate what would be an appropriate target. Oscar Rosen, from the
Global Analytics department had access to the historical forecast and sales data. We presented
the following graph to senior leadership:
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Figure 6.1: Forecast Error Index (Actual Sales/Forecast) for P&G as a whole
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the tolerance ranges that had been in place and the historical company
performance against these metrics. Each data point represents a three month aggregate, though
these are re-measured each month. In the year of data displayed, it is evident that only four out
of thirteen months did the sales fall within the set tolerance range of the forecast.
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The executives driving the project were concerned about accurate reporting to Wall Street and
the financial impact of forecast error. Thus, an important consideration for the global tolerance
was the financial impact from different ranges. The question was posed whether the finance
organization would prefer a tight tolerance, with a low chance of being met, or a wider tolerance
with a higher chance of being met, even if this meant higher forecast error. As financial reserves
can be maintained to balance certain swings, the financial organization indicated that there was a
definite cost associated with higher error, but better certainty of the error range could enable
more efficient planning. To enable better decision making, a probability estimate was warranted.
6.2.2 Using historical data to predict future performance
In choosing an appropriate metric, there appeared to be a pretty clear trade off between setting a
tighter tolerance, and the likelihood that P&G would be able to deliver within the tolerance range
set. To enable decision making and provide clarity to this tradeoff, a numerical assessment of
the likelihood that P&G could perform within certain tolerance ranges was conducted. To
perform this analysis, an assumption was made that the forecast error would follow a normal22
distribution, as recommended by Silver, Pyke and Peterson. This assumes that bias is not
present. However, since P&G strives for a balanced forecast, management directives are in place
to remove bias from the forecasts. Thus, bias should be limited in P&G forecasts.
Probability (within tolerance range) = NORMDIST (upper limit, mean, standard deviation)
- NORMDIST (lower limit, mean, standard deviation)
Using this relationship, different tolerance ranges were tested to determine the likelihood that
P&G's forecast error would fall within the range specified if P&G repeated historical
performance. To protect the confidentiality of data, the four data tolerances were replaced with
the phrases, "very low," "low," "high," and "very high." The following table was generated to
show the likelihood that P&G could meet each of the tolerance ranges:
Global P&G Corporate Tolerance (+/-)Very Low High
I_ ___ Low High
Probability of meeting tolerance with today's 26% 50% 69% 83%
process and no improvements
Probability of meeting tolerance if all regions 29% 54% 73% 86%
remove all forecast bias
Figure 6.2: Probability of Meeting New Global Tolerance Limits
22 Silver, Edward A., David F Pyke, and Rein Peterson. Inventory Management and Production Planning and
Scheduling. 3rd Ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1998.
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Figure 6.2 shows that the current process of setting a tolerance range based on the financial
organizations need for accuracy, results in a high probability that the tolerance will be missed as
the rest of the P&G organization is not capable of delivering forecasts within this tolerance range
on a repeatable basis. With this data in hand, the management team was able to weigh the
different factors impacting the decision to choose what the global tolerance range should be.
Factors included were the motivational impact of choosing metrics which supported continuous
improvement, but didn't discourage organizations by seeming unachievable. Additionally, the
organization was about to start a massive effort to integrate the Gillette Corporation, one of the
larger acquisitions P&G has undertaken, so caution was exercised in choosing a metric that
would create buy-in and motivate people to achieve. By presenting the data in Figure 6.2, and
discussing the factors above, we enabled senior leadership to choose a global tolerance range
which they felt would be best for P&G as a company. By choosing this range for which the
company would be expected to perform at a global level, top-down direction would follow to
ensure that the business would be the basis in further statistical analysis.
6.3 Choosing Appropriate Factors for Statistical Process (Size,
Complexity, Capability)
Having chosen a global tolerance range, the next step was to choose appropriate factors to enable
the statistical process of taking a global tolerance range, and enabling it to be converted into
tolerance ranges for the different business regions and units. As recognized by the company's
senior leadership, in order to have a meaningful metric, people had to buy-into its relevance and
feel accountable. Therefore, the process for allocating the metric needed to be relatively
straightforward, transparent, and clear enough to create buy-in.
6.3.1 Availability of data
One key decision concerned the data which would be used for the process. P&G has multiple
methods for tracking and reporting forecast error. Discussion with involved parties indicated
that the forecast error index was the desired measure as it clearly indicated bias. Another
objective of the S&OP Intervention effort was to drive bias out of the system, therefore the
generation of a new metric system needed to clearly demonstrate bias. Additionally, the index
had been used historically, so was familiar both to demand planners, and the organization which
used the demand plan or was responsible for its accuracy. To create the index, simple forecast
and shipment data obtained from the company information system, and aggregated over a
rolling-three month basis was deemed straightforward, and the organization readily accepted this
as the fundamental source of forecast accuracy information.
6.3.2 Popular opinion
Having determined that the model would be based on simple forecast and actual sales data, the
next question was how to use this data. Discussions with various demand planning process
owners, experienced planners, and managers accountable for the forecast accuracy indicated that
there was a fairly standard opinion regarding what impacted forecast accuracy. If the process
appealed to people's intuition, it would be easier to generate buy-in for the process. Therefore,
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popular opinion was considered heavily when selecting factors to use in the statistics. For
example, some regions are experiencing rapid growth and popular opinion was that it is easier to
forecast a static market, compared with a rapidly changing dynamic market. Additionally, P&G
breaks the world into different segments, with one of these segments including over one hundred
different countries stretching from Africa, across the Middle East, Eastern Europe and even the
countries formed from old Soviet Republics. The cultural and geographical diversity across this
region, along with the communication challenges was commonly believed to make it harder to
forecast. Essentially, popular opinion seemed to indicate that some segments were intrinsically
harder to forecast than other segments, just by the nature of the segment.
6.3.3 Statistical relationships
To select factors, popular opinion indicated that some measure of the intrinsic difficulty to
forecast a segment would be important. To also appeal for the need for simplicity, the variability
within sales was tested to see how strongly it correlated with forecast error. Oscar Rosen, the
Global Analytical statistical expert who devised the process chose to represent variability using a
"volatility factor". This fact was the coefficient of variation, or the standard deviation divided by
the average.23
Volatility factor, vi =
avg sales
While using this volatility factor to represent the intrinsic difficulty in forecasting a segment was
simple, there were many other ideas about other factors other than volatility which would impact
forecast error. Thus we felt it was important to statistically justify that a strong relationship
existed between this volatility factor and forecast error.
5-7
4-
3-
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Volatility
Figure 6.3: Tested relationship between shipment volatility and forecast error (fe)2 1
2Rosen, Oscar. "Forecast Error Allocation and Tracking" P&G Internal Documentation. 6/13/2005.
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Figure 6.3 indicates a relatively good relationship between volatility and forecast error. Further
iterations were performed, and eventually it was determined that the forecast error was correlated
most strongly with the square root of the volatility. Thus this volatility factor was used in the
subsequent statistical model.
Additionally, one point that came across from discussions was that the regions that contributed
larger portions to total P&G sales, would have a larger impact on the overall forecast error. For
example, 5% forecast error in North America, which accounted for almost half of P&G's sales
volume, would have a much larger impact on the total company accuracy, compared with a 5%
forecast error in Australia or India. Thus another component of the statistical process was
chosen to be the total sales volume of the segment.
P&G's Global Analytical department was able to use these two factors, and standard statistical
theory around the aggregation of data to estimate correlations and break out the global tolerance
into regional targets. To enable buy-in, the probability analysis discussed in 6.2.2 Evaluating
probabilities and the likelihood to perform in the future at certain levels was repeated for the
segments. If our assumptions were valid, we would expect historical performance to indicate
that the probabilities of meeting these tolerances would be relatively equivalent across segments.
However, it was surprising to note that the probabilities were quite different. For example, it
was noted that Latin America had an exceptionally high probability of meeting its target
allowance (greater than 99%), whereas other regions of the world were less than 60% likely to
perform within their given tolerance. This could create questioning of the assumptions, and
questioning whether the metrics were fair, and whether they would be accepted and incorporated
into the organizations.
6.3.4 Fairness but flexibility
Discussions with the Demand Planning team of experts indicated that the use of simple sales
volatility and volume was not enough to predict how well a region would perform at forecasting.
There are other factors leading to intrinsic difficulty in forecasting a region, one in particular
being the people in the organization. The average lifespan of a demand planner is 3 years in the
role, so that 1/3 of the organization is new in the role each year. Thus the capability and
experience of the demand planner can impact accuracy. Therefore room was left for another
factor, the current forecast error, to represent the capability of a region and account for
influences not accounted for by the other factors. Thus the three factors to be used would be size,
as approximated by volume, difficulty as approximated by volatility, and capability, as
approximated by forecast error.
6.4 Technical Decisions
The forecast and shipment data was used to determine the factors outlined; however, on running
the statistical model, certain questions arose. Although this was the first time the statistical
process would be used to take the global metric and split it out for sub-units, the desire was to
create a robust and repeatable process that would not require significant rework in the future.
This required evaluating and making appropriate decisions related to certain details.
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Additionally, the model was built with certain flexibility and expandability so that it could be
easily adjusted in future years as the business continued to change, and other requirements were
added.
6.4.1 Scope
When applying a statistical process to take a global metric and translate it into appropriate
metrics for smaller categories, one question arose as to whether all of the components of the total
had to be included. For example, P&G divides the company into seven regional Market
Development Organizations (MDOs) based on geography. However, when allocating the
company sales volume, not every sale falls into one of these seven MDOs. For example, when a
new company is acquired, or when a business is reorganized, sales might temporarily fall into
categories such as "Global Organization" or "Corporate Adjustments". These two extraneous
categories do not fall in the mainstream corporate hierarchy, and more importantly, do not have
business authorities presiding over them. Within P&G, each of the regional MDOs has a
President, who is accountable for the regional business. However, accountability is harder to
trace for these non-regional groups. In the case of the global P&G data, these groups together
accounted for a small fraction of the volume. However, upon review with the P&G analytical
department, the decision was made that all components of the total must be included in the
statistical process. For example, if these groups were excluded from the analysis, but had a large
error associated with them, it might be possible for the components which were included in the
analysis to meet their targets, but the overall organization to miss due to the excluded segments.
Therefore, the process was defined that all components for a total must be included when
splitting out the data.
6.4.2 Duration of history
Another debate ensued surrounding the amount of historical data to use in generating the metrics.
The company stores three years of statistical forecast accuracy history. There are many factors
which would indicate that a long history is better for the statistical process. First of all, longer
time horizon would more accurately show the different environments in which the business
performed. For a consumer products company like P&G, business can be significantly impacted
by the overall health of the economy, something that moves and shifts relatively slowly.
Additionally, certain events such as a hurricane, tsunami or terrorist event can have an impact on
forecast accuracy. Thus the longer time horizon followed, the more these rare events are diluted
in a broader set of data. However, arguments also existed for maintaining a shorter time horizon.
The consumer products business changes quickly with multiple company acquisitions and ever
changing competition. Thus, the most accurate snapshot of the marketplace is a current one.
Additionally, many of the regions P&G services are undergoing rapid changes, and using older
data may not represent the capability moving forward. Additionally, the turnover of demand
planners leads us to believe that a shorter time horizon more accurately represents regional
planning capability. Balancing these factors, and synchronizing with the fiscal year led to the
selection of using twelve months of three month rolling data.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 36 of 103
6.4.3 Update frequency
The frequency at which the metric should be updated was also questioned. For example, should
the integration of a new business trigger a re-run of the process to generate new metrics? Should
the target be allowed to move based on trending business conditions? Or, once the tolerances are
generated, should they be held constant indefinitely so that people grow accustomed to them and
don't believe they are trying to meet a moving target? Discussion with business leaders and the
statistical process owners led to the decision to update the metric every fiscal year. This is fairly
consistent with many metric setting and evaluations processes and is also aligned with the length
of history used to generate the metric.
6.4.4 Leveling Process
The last factor discussed in 6.3.4 Fairness but flexibility also presented difficulties in
incorporating this factor into the statistics, and in allocating appropriate weight it. Essentially the
statistical process used the shipment and forecast history to develop two key factors - shipment
volume and volatility - and from these roll out the target for the aggregate into the sections based
on the shipment volume and volatility in each section. After this was completed the probability
of each section meeting the assigned tolerance was determined based on a year of historical
forecast error. A leveling process was then applied to account for this forecast error, and
essentially re-allocates tolerance range percentage points from the section most likely to meet the
tolerance to the section least likely. An algorithm was determined to essentially level the playing
field by giving each section an equal probability of meeting the tolerance range. This procedure
had a setting allowing it to level to only a certain percentage of what the total difference in
tolerance ranges would be between the range assigned based on volatility and volume only,
versus the range accounting for forecast error. For example, the first step of the process resulted
in Region A having a 70% probability of meeting a tolerance of 3.0%, and Region B had a 99%
probability of meeting a tolerance of 1.5% the tolerance range for Region A would be relaxed
and the range for Region B would be tightened. Supposed both regions reached an equal
tolerance of 88% if the range for Region A was increased to 4.0%, and the range for Region B
was tightened to 1.0%. Instead of using the ranges that ensured an equal probability for all
regions, scaling was applied. Thus the process would result in Region A having a range between
3 and 4% and Region B having a range between 1.0 and 1.5%. Discussions with management
ensued as to whether each region should be given a metric that they were equally likely to meet.
Another option would be to leave some margin for difference in capability. This would reward
regions who had dedicated significant effort in the past to getting to the high level of capability
they had today. Regions with a more difficult metric might be motivated to invest more effort
into improving the forecast accuracy. For example, in the case of Latin America, significant
resources and effort had been dedicated to improving forecast accuracy, and a substantial
improvement had been made in recent history. The decision was made to set the leveling to 70%
of the total change that would have occurred to put the regions on equal probability. This was to
account for differential effort between regions.
6.4.5 Correlations
A slightly more complicated decision involved the statistical process treatment of correlations
between the data. Essentially, statistical routines exist to account for the fact that all of the
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components may not behave completely randomly, but that there may be a link in how they
move. With forecast error between regions, if there is a general worldwide economic slump,
then forecast errors will probably increase around the world. Thus world issues will impact all
regions, thereby correlating the data. On the other hand, most of the contributors to error are
smaller and associated with promotions and events, and these are typically random across
regions. Even seasonality can be diluted across regions. From that standpoint, for a product
consumed more heavily in the summer, there may be negative correlation between northern
hemisphere and southern hemisphere regions that experience summer during different months of
the year.
6.4.5.1 What Do They Mean: Positive, Negative, None
Positive correlations imply data is not completely random, some trends occur across regions in
the same direction at the same time. If positive correlations are found, the statistical process to
account for this will tighten the tolerance ranges necessary to deliver the main tolerance as it is
likely that error would move in the same direction across groups at a given time, and not benefit
from aggregation and leveling of variability by combining units. Negative correlations imply
data for different groups will trend in the opposite direction. If this exists, the statistical process
to account for this will loosen the tolerance ranges necessary to deliver the set tolerance as it is
likely that error would move in the opposite direction across groups at a given time. No
correlation implies data is completely random.
6.4.5.2 Implications of Correlation Assumptions
A decision had to be made on how to account for correlations in the data. Since only a year of
data is used, it is possible that the algorithm to determine if correlations exist might account for a
phenomenon which was purely random. Many discussions were held between the global
demand planning experts to assess their opinion of whether or not correlations exist in the real
world between groups of products or forecast errors. Essentially, if we chose to allow positive
correlations, the tolerance ranges might be set tighter than necessary, challenging the business
more than required, but leaving a higher likelihood that if the segments meet their tolerances,
that the aggregated tolerance would be met as well. On the other hand, if we allow negative
correlations, and the data indicates this type of correlation exists where it was only an anomaly,
the tolerance ranges for the subgroups might be set too broadly, allowing for each of the
subgroups to make their tolerance goal, but the overarching organization to miss.
6.4.5.3 What Did We Choose and Why?
After reflection, the conservative approach was chosen to allow for positive correlations. The
model was built flexible so that this approach could be modified for future years. The choice to
use positive correlations will result in more conservative (narrow) tolerances, although it risks
being too conservative due to correlations from chance alone. The model does not give credit if
the overall covariance is negative because it means that credit is being given for groups
offsetting each other, and we did not want to count on that behavior being repeatable.
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6.4.6 Standard Deviation
Options for different calculation methods for standard deviation were presented and debated.
6.4.6.1 Options
"Short-Term" Standard Deviation: Our statistical expert found reference to a non-standard
method for calculating the standard deviation term in the probability formula which is argued to
be better at predicting future behavior based on history. It is used in the JMP statistical software
tool for capability studies and is computed using the method for control charting and is based on
the moving range.
n--1
1 xi+ -xi
i=1 24
n -1
Additionally, the conventional standard deviation algorithm could be used.
(x - )2
= n-l
In the above equations, X represents the average of the data, xi represents an individual data
point, n represents the total number of data points.
6.4.6.2 Evaluation
The different options for standard deviation provided different probabilities of meeting a given
tolerance. These differences hinged on a behavior called "chasing." Chasing is a phenomenon
where data points trend in the same direction for a period of time. The following figure
demonstrates considerable chasing:
24 JMP Stat Graph Guide. Version 5.1
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Rolling 3 Month Moving Averages
Figure 6.4 "Chasing" phenomenon where data points tend to trend in a single direction
For units with chasing, as shown in Figure 6.4, the probability of meeting the tolerance is much
higher using the 'short-term' standard deviation as it assumes improvements will occur and the
data will be more randomly up and down. For the data displayed in Figure 6.4, the conventional
standard deviation indicated a 71% probability that the future data points would fall within range,
whereas the predictive standard deviation indicated a 96% probability that future data points
would fall within range. On the other hand, some regions had data which tended to swing back
and forth without consistently moving in one direction as shown in the following figure:
Rolling 3 Month Moving Averages
Figure 6.5 No "chasing" phenomenon where data points tend to fluctuate both up and down.
For figure 6.5 the conventional standard deviation indicates a 99% probability that future data
would fall within the specification range; whereas the predictive standard deviation indicates a
96% probability that data would be within specification. Reviewing these behaviors and the data,
we chose to use conventional standard deviation, as it appeared to give a more appropriate
relationship for our rolling three month data - where between two successive data points, two out
of the three months included in each of these data points are the same.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 40 of 103
6.5 Implementation
The previous sections detailed the development of the statistical process for taking a broad
tolerance, and determining what the appropriate tolerances would be for the subcomponents of
the total. However, the new accountability process had to be implemented to be successful.
6.5.1 Implementation Strategy
During development and testing of the statistical model, the global process experts for demand
planning, along with the managers responsible for accuracy were frequently consulted for their
advice on process development. Their input and suggestion also helped generate feelings of
commitment, ownership and buy-in from this respected and well-experienced group of
individuals. Senior management would also need to be sold on the idea and to drive the top-
down metrics. Finally, the managers accountable for the new metrics had to buy into their
importance, and understand a tool developed to allow managers to take their tolerance range and
break it out for their own sub-units. This is demonstrated in the following figure:
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Figure 6.6 Tolerance deployment process (data was adjusted to protect confidentiality)25
2 Yuhas, Jim. Intemal P&G Documentation. North American Demand Planning. Modified for confidentiality.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006
cst eam
Level
JG5550157 1 4.0 6
0 0
CN HABA I GIN HHN
Page 41 of 103
Figure 6.6 demonstrates how a regional manager uses the process to first take the tolerance from
upper management and deploy it throughout the organization. This manager first splits North
America into the US and Canada, then splits the tolerance by business unit, and then into
business segment. The figure also depicts the general trend of tolerance ranges increasing the
deeper the level of the organization. This is due to the disaggregating and smaller volumes at
smaller levels. Essentially, as long as the tolerances at these small levels are met, the tighter
tolerances at the higher levels are met as errors balance out when combined.
6.5.2 Issues and Execution
The plan for implementation was to ensure that representatives who carried weight within the
organizations to be impacted were part of the process at each step. The statistical work was
conducted by an expert from the Global Analytical department. Demand planning input was
obtained by frequent reviews with the Global Demand Planning process owner, and an expert
with over twenty years of demand planning experience. Additionally, the person from the sales
organization responsible for reporting on forecast accuracy for the company was included in
each of the team meetings. Throughout the implementation process, these people were included
in the team reviews and consulted for their opinions. This ensured buy-in from the organizations
in general. However, the process needed support both up and down the organization.
The team met with corporate executives representing global Finance, Consumer Market
Knowledge, Customer Service and Logistics, and Sales organizations. This was the set of
executives who had mandated the intervention to create accountability for forecast accuracy.
The group reconvened and the team presented an overview of the statistical process and received
management approval. Additionally, as this was a top-down process, the set of executives
deployed the global tolerance discussed in 6.2 Setting a Global Metric and accepted the output of
the statistical process to deploy forecast accuracy tolerances to the regional business presidents.
Meanwhile, the regional business presidents knew that new metrics were going to be deployed
soon, and were asking their demand planning process owners for any sort of early information
about tolerances or capability. This created a bit of excitement throughout the organization, and
we used this to start obtaining buy-in from the organization to test the tool throughout the
development process. For example, the North American Demand Planning Manager found
several issues with the statistical model which we were able to improve upon before rolling it out.
Also, obtaining his buy-in early in the process smoothed the rollout to the rest of the
organizations worldwide. To deploy it to the rest of the world, a teleconference was held with
regions around the world to discuss the new metrics, the statistical process, to deploy the
tolerances and give them a tool to be able to sub-divide them throughout their organization. For
example, Western Europe first subdivided into countries, then into businesses within the country.
Although behind schedule, the process was deployed within the second month of the new fiscal
year and was met with acceptance. The number of questions and feedback generated is a good
indication that it is capturing attention throughout the organization.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 42 of 103
6.6 Summary and Recommendations
In review, this project was successful in its set goal of creating accountability for forecast
accuracy throughout the organization. The previous policy of setting arbitrary and identical
targets for accuracy across all levels, regardless of size or complexity, had not been supported,
and the metrics were generally ignored. The statistical process was developed with significant
input from the representative parties, and implemented in an approach which generated internal
buy-in to the new metrics. The statistical analysis and attention at a high level to accuracy
produced not only higher accountability, but highlighted areas of opportunity for the
organization.
6.6.1 Bias - Using the Process to Emphasizing its Effect
One area for improvement clearly visible from the study surrounded the area of forecast bias.
The term bias is used to describe the tendency for errors to occur in one direction - either
consistently over- or under- forecasting demand. Where the statistical analysis indicated a strong
history of bias, management was questioned to determine what policies were in place
encouraging this bias. For example, numerous publications reference how earnings estimates are
optimistically biased 2 6. At the executive level, the drive for a 50/50 forecast began to be pushed
throughout the organization. This indicated that the probability of forecasting under/over should
be 50/50 indicating that it is a true reflection of believed market behavior, and not slanted due to
internal policies. Management felt strongly that capability and tolerances should be set assuming
that businesses can operate without bias. For example, in the leveling process which adjusts the
tolerances for the capability of regions, bias is estimated and removed from the historical data.
Essentially, the average index over the history is determined, and each data point is adjusted up
or down as necessary to set the average index to 100, indicating no bias is present. With this
adjusted data, a new capability is determined, which is used to adjust the final tolerances. For
example, some groups had a history of poor accuracy, driven by poor bias, but were fairly
consistent with their errors. While historical data exhibits poor capability, once adjusting the
bias out, the capability would look much better and the group would be given a tighter
specification assuming they could remove the management bias immediately. The following
figure shows an example of this:
26 Han, Bong H, David Manry, Wayne Shaw. "Improving the Precision of Analysts' Earnings
Forecasts by Adjusting for Predictable Bias" Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 17: 81-98, 2001.
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Figure 6.7 Historical Accuracy plotted against tolerance limits
Figure 6.7 shows the impact of bias. The last year's worth of data for this business indicates that
only once did a data point exceed 100% (having more shipments then forecast). Essentially, this
business consistently forecasts sales to be higher than they actually prove to be. The solid lines
at the outer range indicate the tolerance limits set by the process. According to these limits, five
of the historical data points would fall outside of the limit. This is due to bias, shown by the
black line at 96.7% indicates the mean of the data. However, if bias was removed and all of the
data points were shifted upwards adjusting the mean to 100% as shown below:
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Figure 6.8 Historical Accuracy adjusted to remove bias, against tolerance limits
Figure 6.8 shows the impact of removing bias. Now, with all of the data points adjusted, we can
see that each of the historical data points would fall within the tolerance range. The impact that
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this powerful graphic has conveys the importance of the management directive to attain unbiased
forecasts.
6.6.2 Organizational impact
Overall, accountability for forecast accuracy and sponsorship for improvement is difficult in
P&G's organizational design. The Global Business Units essentially run the branded business
for P&G, and include marketing, finance, and the product supply organizations. The product
supply organization controls the cost of manufacturing, making sure the right amount is available
at the specified time. However, product supply is not responsible for generating the demand
forecast. The demand planners are part of the Market Development Organization. The MDO
includes the sales, customer service and logistics organizations across all the brands for a region.
Thus, the organization that controls the process for determining the sales forecast does not
actually use the forecast. Therefore, the MDO may decide to reorganize, reduce headcount, or
make other changes which may impact forecast accuracy. The main impact would be felt in the
GBU, which might be asked for funding to support additional headcount. While processes are in
place to smooth the collaboration between the units, the S&OP Intervention is taking a broader
step, by setting metrics for forecast accuracy in the scorecard of managers in the GBU.
Essentially they are now responsible for meeting targets which are set by people not in their
organization. This is yet another example of how work at P&G is conducted through
relationships as much as it is accomplished through formal structures and authority.
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7 Improving Forecast Accuracy
This thesis has discussed the importance of forecast accuracy and the impact poor forecasts can
have on many different levels of the organization. While the global process organization does an
excellent job of evaluating and improving the demand planning process, real funding for
improvement needs to be justified by the organizations affected by the forecast improvement.
Thus, establishing metrics and accountability for forecast accuracy lends transparency to the
expectations and the results, and also aids in justifying further improvement efforts. The effects
of forecast accuracy are so widespread, that the impact they have on the customer service
organization can be enough to justify investment into improvements. This chapter will evaluate
the trial of a new system for customer accounts where P&G manages the customer's inventory.
A similar sharing of information across customer relationships has been discussed regarding
P&G and Wal-Mart. Michael Green, the Director of Information Technology for the Wal-Mart
Sales Team at P&G writes about the effects of the experience.27
"P&G replenished Wal-Mart's inventory based on inventory data received from
Wal-Mart's distribution center (DC). This data allowed P&G to manage the
inventory levels to ensure that P&G products were in stock at all times. P&G
reduced the order cycle time (amount of time from the order generation to
delivery) by 3-4 days. This process also dramatically increased inventory turns
which resulted in a reduction in the inventory of the entire system."
Thus the P&G and Wal-Mart experience shows that shared information can have a direct benefit
to the business. Thus the new system discussed in this chapter evaluated for P&G and one of its
grocery customers was intended to provide more granular input data for generating forecasts, and
thus expected to improve accuracy.
7.1 Current System: Customer Replenishment Process, SAP FIRST
Vendor Managed Inventory, VMI, refers to the relationship between P&G and a customer where
P&G tracks the inventory at the customer distribution center, and replenishes stock according to
the customer's needs. The customer, for example, a mass-merchandiser or grocery store chain,
shares its shipment and inventory data with P&G, so that P&G can generate and fulfill purchase
orders to maintain an agreed quantity in the customer's distribution centers.
P&G's customer service organization is responsible for working with the customer to track the
inventory level and place the shipment orders so that the customer's inventory will be properly
maintained. The process that the customer service organization utilizes to monitor and replenish
material is referred to as the Customer Replenishment Process, or CRP. The consumer service
representative is evaluated based on the inventory levels maintained at the customer, the service
level (preventing out-of-stocks) and the customer feedback. There is a perception that the more
27 Grean Michael and Michael Shaw. "Supply-Chain Integration through Information Sharing: Channel Partnership
between Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble"
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personal attention, and the more "touches" a representative makes to the process for the customer,
the better the service.
The demand planning process is the same regardless of whether or not P&G has visibility to the
customer inventory level. The demand planner uses a system co-developed by P&G and SAP,
called FIRST, to maintain a demand model and generate a demand plan. The planner also
consults with account reps to learn when an event such as a promotion or introduction of a new
product is planned, and accounts for these instances. While the demand planner generates a
forecast for each individual SKU, the forecasts are aggregated for weekly buckets, and for
customer groups. For example, all of the grocery chains may be aggregated into one customer
group.
The level that the customer service representative works is much more detailed than the level
that the demand planner functions at. Thus, in the current system, there is little connection
between the demand planners' weekly process and the customer service reps' process for
generating orders for the customer's distribution centers.
7.2 Proposed System: SAP-Responsive Replenishment
P&G has partnered with SAP to develop a new system solution, Responsive Replenishment,
which improves short term demand visibility for cases specifically where a VMI relationship
exists with a customer. The new system, RR, includes an interface between the customer's
information system and P&G providing visibility to inventory levels and shipments from
customer's distribution centers on an automated basis. The new system also integrates the
inclusion of special event information. The new system automatically generates a short-term
forecast from the recent history, thus the demand planning process is not necessary for short-
term forecasting.
The new system is only applicable for very short-term forecasting. The P&G demand planning
process develops a forecast for two years into the future. The timely visibility to customer
inventory and sales data will provide little benefit to long-term forecasting. Thus RR is intended
to only replace the demand plan for only a couple of weeks. Additionally, the RR system is only
applicable for customers with a VMI relationship with P&G. The following figure depicts how
RR is only applicable for a fraction of the planning process.
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Figure 7.1 Fraction of the Planning Process that can utilize Responsive Replenishment
Figure 7.1 depicts that the RR system is only applicable for part of the short-term forecast, and
will have no effect on mid to long-term planning. This can be seen as the RR box only stretches
a short distance in the x-direction. Additionally, RR is limited in the y-direction as the system
can only be used where P&G manages the inventory at the customer's location. Thus, this block
represents the small fraction of P&G's demand planning which RR can support.
The business process also changes using RR. The system now automatically conducts
forecasting, DRP (demand requirements planning), TLB (truck load building) and order creation.
The customer service representative monitors the output and can intervene if necessary. The RR
system uses the history and model parameters to forecast the demand requirements for a few
weeks in the future. RR executes DRP which assesses how much is needed to keep the customer
in-stock and then rounds the quantities into orders based on P&G order constraints. An example
of a constraint is that full cases or pallets must be shipped as the distribution center should only
order a minimum quantity of a case of deodorant, not a single stick. The customer service
representative then uses RR to run the TLB process which optimizes the order to add or remove
products to minimize customer out of stocks while balancing a low inventory level. Finally, the
purchase orders are created and the customer service representative reviews them and releases
the orders for processing.
7.3 System Differences
Although RR can only be applied to a fraction of P&G's business, the impact was expected to be
large and justify the substantial development effort. The following table summarizes the key
differences between the systems and processes with the current and proposed systems.
CRP + SAP-FIRST RR
* Existing system and process * New system and process
* Not currently linked to live * Linked to customer information
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customer data system
* Produces weekly forecast * Produces daily forecast
* Updates forecast weekly * Updates forecast daily
* Forecasts for aggregated customer 9 Forecasts at customer distribution
group (e.g. All Mass Grocers) center level (e.g. Boston Warehouse
for Shaw's Grocery)
* Event information collected for 0 Event information visible and input
major customers and aggregate at a customer DC level,
scaled
* Active management required 1 Exception driven process
Figure 7.2 Comparison of Current versus New System
Figure 7.2 depicts how more granular input data will be available for generating forecasts. The
current system takes snapshots from the customer data, and then updates the long range plan,
generating forecasts for weekly buckets at a customer-group, regional level. It only updates
when it is executed each week, thus if new information is received in the middle of the week, it
will not be reflected until the plan is run the subsequent week. The new system is linked to the
customer information system and thus it can be set to update the forecast daily. Additionally, as
it sees the daily transactions at the customer distribution centers, it can be configured to predict
daily sales from particular P&G plants or distribution centers, as it knows the exact planned
location of the shipment, and is the same software that rounds the trucks out to create full-truck
loads. Hypothetical examples of forecasts from the two systems highlight these differences:
Current Demand Planning Example Forecast: For week 26, Wal-Mart in North America will
purchase 1000 units of Cold Water Tide in I00oz bottles. All-mass-grocers will purchase 800
units of Cold Water Tide in 100 oz bottles.
RR Demand Planning Example Forecast: For week 26, Monday, Wal-Mart Distribution Center
in Arkansas will purchase 32 units of Cold Water Tide in I00oz bottles from P&G's Cincinnati
Distribution Center. Tuesday, the Shaw's Market Distribution Center in Cambridge will
purchase 20 units of Cold Water Tide in 100 oz bottles from P&G's Boston Distribution Center.
These highlighted differences between the proposed system and the existing system would
clearly provide more granular data, which should theoretically produce a better forecast. To
quantify the savings potential from the implementation of the new system, a pilot test was
conducted.
7.4 Pilot Scope
An integrated pilot was commissioned to investigate the impact from implanting the new
developed RR (Responsive Replenishment) system. This section will provide context and scope
for the pilot trial.
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7.4.1 Motivation and Broad Scope
Turn forecasts are relatively predictable with the current process. Opportunities for
improvement lie in better event visibility and in incorporating more detailed information to the
forecast. This additional level of detail should be more accurate than the current logic of
maintaining average relationships of how a product volume is split between days and sites,
commonly called the "split tables". Thus, this new system appeared promising as it would
incorporate granular promotion forecasts and shipment data into the demand planning process. It
would allow for actual event/promotion performance feedback to be incorporated into the
process. All of this information would now be seen and able to be analyzed and improved at the
producing site level, improving the supply planning operation at P&G. With this new system
providing these clear advantages, quantifying the value of these savings became important as the
costs were non-trivial. Not only was the cost of development of the system expensive, but the
cost of the implementation, along with the organizational changes, were worrisome, especially
since this large fixed cost system solution was only applicable to a fraction of P&G's customer
relationship. Thus, the pilot test was commissioned to get the new system up and running for a
test scope to prove its functionality, and to quantify the savings possible. These savings were
then to be extrapolated to the rest of P&G to determine whether a full implementation was
justified.
7.4.2 Expected Impact
The differences from the new system implied many changes which were expected to have a
significant impact in the following areas:
" Improved Sales: Specifically, the closer connection between the customer distribution center
and the forecast was expected to reduce the out-of-stock (OOS) occurrences. Out-of-stocks
can lead to lost sales, which can be very costly for a branded product and can translate into a
lost customer. These savings were supposed to have a larger impact for merchandising
events and instances when supply disruption type activities occur.
" Reduced operating cost: This improved visibility would reduce costs associated with
emergency orders to respond to product gaps, avoiding the out of stocks in the above
example.
* Reduced inventory: True visibility to the customer was expected to reduce variability and
therefore reduce safety stock.
* The implementation and organizational cost would be measured for the infrastructure and
supporting organizational changes.
A larger effort was underway at P&G to invest in numerous projects leading towards a
"Consumer Driven Supply Network." This RR project was intended to serve as an example of
the type of time, cash and costs savings from implementing an end-to-end integrated solution. It
would demonstrate the ability to leverage results in a core P&G business - big category, big
country, and big customer. It would also quantitatively demonstrate that demand information for
events can flow from the customer to the producing site to enable visibility in the supply network.
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7.4.3 Detailed Scope
To accomplish the goals of the project, a narrow scope was defined using one of P&G's core
business areas:
" Product: Essentially all of the brands and products associated with a major category for P&G
were chosen to be in scope.
* Customer: One major grocery chain was selected and 11 of its distribution centers were
included in the scope.
* Duration: All volume over 3 month period was to be measured.
* Information: The systems would be implemented as a final design and implementation costs,
supply network benefits, and organizational/work process lessons would be captured
7.5 Evaluation
The major cost savings was intended to come from inventory savings from improved forecast
accuracy. Thus, to evaluate the savings potential, the accuracy improvement had to be measured
and translated into a dollar value. P&G has a department, "Global Analytics" which set the
statistical process for determining safety stock.
7.5.1 P&G Safety Stock Model
Wim Van de Velde provided training and background on the P&G process, which will be
summarized in this section.2 8 P&G utilizes one model for all P&G regions, all business units.
For some complex businesses a 'custom model' is built to address the need, or the model is
upgraded to include the scenario. Four main factors influence safety stock:
* Supply chain uncertainty/variability, Y. This includes forecast error, production schedule
unreliability, and lead time uncertainty. Most effort should go towards estimating the biggest
source of uncertainty. Generally, P&G has managed to control production and transportation
relatively well. The big 'unreliability' struggled with is forecast error. Thus most attention is
paid to demand uncertainty for determining safety stock.
* Total Reaction Time, TRT, is the time between the identification of a production need and
the finished product being available at the P&G DC to be picked for shipment to the P&G
customer. This time includes the lead time to get into a production schedule, supply lead
time for materials not held in inventory, quality release time, transportation time.
* Target availability, Avle, is the desired service level, which represents the percentage that the
product is available on the shelf.
" Cycle Time/Batch coverage, represents the batch size. For example, frequent production of
small batches will result in lower inventory.
Safety stock is determined by the following formula:
SSDays = kx udaIy x TR T
The variability term is determined by taking the standard deviation of relative forecast error:
(Forecast-Actual)/Forecast. However, as this is not readily available, most P&G businesses
28 Van de Velde, Wim. "Finished Product Inventory Model Training." P&G Internal Documentation. March 2006
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approximate the term using the following relationship: CFE Z 1.25 MAPE, where MAPE is the
mean-average-percent-error discussed in 5.4 MAPE, Mean-Absolute Percent Error. However,
for the purposes of setting safety stock, MAPE should not be aggregated across products, and
needs to be determined across a time period. With this information determined, it was clear that
the appropriate measure for evaluating an opportunity in inventory savings would require
forecast accuracy to be measured using MAPE.
7.5.2 Measuring Forecast Accuracy Improvement
To measure the improvement in forecast accuracy, data was extracted and analyzed each week
regarding the forecasts and shipments for both the RR and FIRST systems.
7.5.2.1 MAPE by SKU -> Method
Each week, the forecast and shipment data was pulled for each SKU in scope for the previous
week's shipments. The shipments were compared to ensure that the scope was identical, and that
no data issues were present with data collection. An issue in the master data delayed collection
of accuracy data for four weeks. Forecast horizons for 1, 2, 3 and 4 week intervals were
evaluated. Thus for each SKU, and for each forecast horizon, the absolute percent error was
determined. Simultaneously, the process checked to make sure that a forecast and shipment were
recorded in both system, FIRST and RR. If either system did not indicate a shipment or a
forecast, the data point was not ignored for that SKU. This was done so that the same group of
SKUs and same amount of data would be used in the comparison. The discrepancies were fed
back to the respective groups to be investigated. The direct correlation to inventory savings
would come from the MAPE calculated by averaging across a given SKU for the duration of the
pilot. The MAPEs for the different SKUs could then be averaged across the set of products to
give an aggregated accuracy measure for the pilot. While this was the final method to be related
to inventory savings, each week the MAPE was aggregated across the SKUs to give an
indication of how accurate the system was performing.
7.5.2.2 MAPE by SKU, and by manufacturing site -> Method
One of the expected benefits from the RR system was the detailed level of information,
providing forecasts for the producing site. The RR system had visibility to the exact customer
distribution center to which the shipment would be sent, and thus could provide P&G site
specific forecasts. The current system, SAP-FIRST, generates forecasts at the regional level, and
then a split table divides the demand between the plants. For example, one product line with two
manufacturing plants had a 30%/70% split maintained. After the demand plan was generated,
the split table divided the total demand into plants for the supply planners to fulfill. A
calculation was used to determine the accuracy improvement of RR over the SAP-FIRST system
at the site level. To perform this analysis, the component absolute percent errors (APEs) were
determined from the RR forecast by site, and averaged to determine the MAPE across product
lines by site, for a given forecast horizon. The regional forecasts were extracted from SAP-
FIRST, and split according to the split table logic to determine what the site forecasts would
have been. The MAPE accuracy was then calculated for these sites from SAP-FIRST. This
analysis should be more applicable to the business cost as it directly indicates how the forecast is
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consumed by the downstream DRP (demand requirements planning) operation. However, the
smaller volumes at each site will have larger error as they have lost the impact of aggregation
from combining two demand streams.
7.5.2.3 Daily MAPE
While most of the accuracy calculations were based on weekly buckets, RR has the ability to
forecast on a daily basis, as it evaluates the daily shipments from the customer distribution center.
A calculation was also desired to determine the improvement of RR over SAP-FIRST. A
MAPE was calculated for RR for daily buckets. For SAP-FIRST, the daily split tables were used
to convert weekly forecasts into daily forecasts, and then the actual shipment data was obtained
on a daily basis. However, the shipment volume to the customer in the pilot was too small for
this analysis to be meaningful. Typically, there would be one day a week where a product was
shipped, and since the forecast was spread across the entire week, the scale of the pilot could not
support daily analysis. This same approach was also attempted for rolling three day consecutive
shipments to attempt to alleviate the problem above, however, it did not yield much information.
7.5.2.4 MAPE by Customer Distribution Center
Additionally, the MAPE was determined for each of the customer distribution centers. Each
week we attempted to analyze if a particular distribution center had higher error than another.
However, this analysis did not provide any insight and only assisted in investigating the root
cause of forecast errors.
7.5.3 Extrapolating to P&G
Wim Van de Velde, from Global Analytics championed a process for extrapolating the savings
potential to all of P&G. 2 9 This process was important as it would be critical to a multi-million
dollar investment decision. To extrapolate savings, several assumptions were required. Each of
these was supported by the Global Analytics department. First, it was assumed that the
percentage-point improvement in forecast accuracy would be achievable for the rest of P&G's
businesses. Next, this improvement would only occur for the fraction of the business operating
under VMI. So while that fraction of the total volume will have an improvement in forecast
accuracy, the effect on the accuracy of the remainder would is unknown. It is possible that when
VMI inventory is removed, the forecast accuracy would worsen for the remaining volume as
disaggregating increases error. However, it was assumed that error would be approximately the
same for the total volume, and for the non-VMI volume, as VMI represents a small fraction of
the total volume. This could be verified if forecast history could be differentiated based on VMI
and non-VMI relationships. However, forecast history is not stored by customer, therefore this is
not possible using the information system, and would have to be built manually by collecting
data points.
29 Van de Velde, Wim. "Finished Product Inventory Model Training." P&G Internal Documentation. March 2006
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7.6 Findings
Surprisingly, the accuracy achieved by RR was only marginally better than FIRST, and not
sufficient to justify further investment. This section will review the results of the analysis and
other findings uncovered which help to explain why the RR project was canceled.
7.6.1 MAPE by SKU -> Results
The key driver for cost savings was expected to come from improved MAPE which would
translate into inventory savings from reduced safety stock. The calculation was performed as
described above with a few modifications. As mentioned before, approximately four weeks of
data were not usable due to an initial master data issue. Then subsequently, communication
problems at the end of the pilot led to confusion regarding when the transition back to CRP was
to occur. This resulted in the last week of data having to be discarded as the RR data was not
complete. Other issues related to the work process employed by the end users produced points
for a particular SKU for a particular week of exceptionally high error. The largest contributors
to forecast error were evaluated each week, and if attributed to poor training for the new system
startup, and not expected to recur, the forecast was adjusted to compensate for this. The
concluding results of the forecast accuracy comparison are shown in the table below for the
smallest time horizon (1-week).
Vert Horz
DP MAPE 64% 56% 55% 44% 49% 56% 53% 64% 58% 55%
RR MAPE 51% 31% 71% 38% 56% 63%. 37%. 70% 60% 53%
Point Improvementl 13% 25% -16%1 6% 7% O -7% 16%1 -6%1 -2*/o 2%.
Percent improv ment 21% 44% -28% 13% -14V/ -13% 30% -9% -4% 4%
Figure 7.3 Forecast Error Comparison for 1-week forecast horizon
Reviewing the MAPE for all of the SKUs, aggregated across time in Figure 7.3 shows small to
no improvement in most weeks, and essentially no improvement overall. The last column is
blank to emphasize the week of missed data, and how one organizational miscommunication can
result in a loss of over 10% of the data possible. Each of the weeks was included to highlight
that the error in RR seemed to be much more variable than SAP-FIRST. While SAP-FIRST had
minimal attention from the Demand Planner as this customer represented a very tiny fraction of
the overall demand volume, the forecast was relatively steady and error occurred from variability
in shipments, varying between 44 and 64% error. On the other hand, RR varied from 31 to 71%
error. RR ranged from 25% points better than FIRST, to 16% points worse that FIRST. This
behavior was unexpected and provoked further analysis.
Products were classified into New (newly introduced SKU with little history), Promo (highly
promoted products), and Turn (the majority of the SKUs without any exceptional behavior. The
error measure (MAPE) was aggregated for products along these lines in the following tables:
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Forecast Accuracy by Material Ty: 8kAverage by Sku
RR DATA FIRST
Weeks Back PROMO NEW TURN PROMO NEW TURN
MAPE # skus MAPE # skus MAPE # skus MAPE # skus MAPE # skus MAPE # skus
wk 01 77% 1 137% 10 51% 80 76% 1 93% 10 53% 80
wk 02 N/A 0 129% 9 47% 79 N/A 0 161% 9 51% 79
Wk N/A 0 463% 9 66% 82 N/A 0 255% 9 58% 82
Figure 7.4 Forecast Error Comparison broken out by New, Promoted or Turn Products
Evaluating the differences between the turn, new and promoted products showed that for 1, and 2
week forecast horizons, RR was nominally better than FIRST. For 1 week forecast horizons, the
difference between RR and FIRST came from the new product data. Additionally, for the 2,
week forecast horizon, RR was better than FIRST in both categories. This prompted evaluation
of multiple weeks back as shown in the following table:
RR DATA I FIRST I
Figure 7.5 Summary of RR versus FIRST Forecast Error for different horizons.
It was surprising to see the accuracy improve when forecasts were generated further from the
actual shipment date. Standard supply chain management textbooks emphasize that long-range
forecasts are less accurate than short-range forecasts.30 A potential reason for this, to be
discussed in further detail later, is that as the actual shipment date approached, the customer
service reps were paying more attention to the order and making more user interventions
intended to improve service to the customer. But before discussing this, a little more analysis
was conducted to analyze the behavior of RR versus FIRST for different forecast horizons. The
following figure shows data points for each of the forecast horizons over time. If RR was better
than FIRST, the data point appears above the bold line on the top half of the graph. If FIRST
had less error than RR then the data point appears below the bottom line on the bottom half of
the graph. The magnitude represents the difference between the two systems.
30 Anupindi, Ravi, Sunil Chopra, Sudhakar Deshmukh, Jan A. Van Mieghem, Eitan Zemel. Managing Business
Flows. Prentice Hall, 1999.
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Weeks Back MAPE MAPE
wk01 60% 58%
wk 02 55% 63%
wk 03 105% 78%
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RR Better than FIRST ??
(removing worst 5 data points)
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Figure 7.6 Difference between RR and FIRST forecast errors
Evaluating the figure above, FIRST clearly does a better job of forecast 4 weeks out. But after
that, the data points get much closer together. While there is fluctuation from week to week, this
graph shows that there are many weeks where RR does outperform FIRST, or the difference is
negligible. To see this more clearly, one more graph was generated for the one and two week
back horizons.
Forecast Error Over Time - System Comparison, I
and 2 Weeks Back
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Figure 7.7 Comparing RR and DP for 1 and 2 week horizons
The solid lines indicate the one week horizon, and the dotted lines represent the two week
horizon. The lower the line is, the lower the error. Thus the RR lines (darker) seem to start
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below the FIRST lines, then swap above, and then come quite close to the FIRST error. Another
hypothesis as that at the beginning of the implementation, users were still being trained in the
system and were not making overrides or adjustments. But as they became more comfortable,
the number of interventions increased, decreasing the optimality of the system.
7.6.2 MAPE by SKU, and by manufacturing site -> Results
Disappointed in the improvement at the aggregated level for the shipments in total, an analysis
was conducted evaluating the accuracy at the plant levels for the producing plants at P&G. The
results are shown in the two figures below.
I Wk Back MAPE
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Figure 7.8 Comparing RR and DP at the plant level for a 1 week horizon
In Figure 7.8, the solid lines represent RR and the dotted lines represent SAP-FIRST. Standard
supply chain textbooks indicate that aggregated forecasts should be more accurate than
individual forecasts. 31 Therefore the darkest line which represents the total volume should be
expected to have the lowest error. As the demand is disaggregated for the producing plants, the
error is expected to increase. RR was expected to have much lower error, as the forecast for the
producing plant was developed based on the exact shipments for that plant. DP was expected to
have higher error as a fixed ratio was used to divide demand between plans without any time-
based intelligence. These charts do not show any definite improvement of RR over DP for the
manufacturing site. There are some instances where RR is an improvement over DP; however,
we did not see the overwhelming improvement expected. This demonstrates that the split tables
used to split customer demand into the manufacturing sites, while seemingly crude, are fairly
accurate.
3 Anupindi, Ravi, Sunil Chopra, Sudhakar Deshmukh, Jan A. Van Mieghem, Eitan Zemel. Managing Business
Flows. Prentice Hall, 1999.
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Figure 7.9 Comparing RR and DP at the plant level for a 2 week horizon
In Figure 7.9, again, the solid lines (RR) appear to generally have larger error than their dotted
(FIRST) counterparts indicating that even for the two week forecast horizon, FIRST is just about
as good as the complicated RR system.
7.6.3 SAP-FIRST Forecast better than anticipated
The above findings that RR provided minimal to no improvement over the FIRST forecast
generated the idea that maybe the SAP-FIRST forecast did not have significant room for
improvement. Thus, the following analysis was conducted using the legacy system, SAP-FIRST,
to evaluate the different customer groups and their accuracy for the business analyzed.
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Figure 7.10 Forecast errors from the legacy system (SAP-FIRST) for different customer groups
for the piloted business category
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The expected relationship between shipment volume and error for the same products in the same
region, would be that the larger volume customers would have more predictable behavior as the
different stores comprising the large volume would balance out each others abnormalities.
However, Figure 7.10 does not show a strong relationship between shipment volume and
forecast error for the customer groupings and business displayed. Instead, the data point
associated with the pilot has the smallest volume on the graph, as it represented only 11
distribution centers for one of the grocery store chains. However, it was surprising to see that
this very small volume had one of the lowest errors.
Following this, a series of studies were conducted across all of P&G's businesses using the
legacy system (SAP-FIRST) to determine if a strong relationship could be determined between
forecast error and some measure of magnitude - whether absolute shipment volume, shipment %
of business, or the number of SKUs.
MAPE vs Shipment Volume
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MAPE vs Shipment as a % of Business
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MAPE vs Number of Skus
Figure 7.11 Error versus absolute shipment volume, shipment % of business, and the number of
SKUs
Attempts were made to fit an equation to the data in figure 7.11. Linear, logarithmic,
exponential, and polynomial regressions were conducted to evaluate if the data would fit any of
these relationships. Across all of the regressions, the highest r-squared value achieved was 0.03.
This indicates a very poor fit of data to the equation. Thus, no strong correlations were indicated
by this data. However, the abnormally high error tends to occur for the smaller volumes and the
abnormally high volumes tend to have reasonable error. What this may indicate, is that there are
other important effects, such as the buying behavior of the customer, the relationship with P&G,
or the products and plan themselves which may account for the error more so than the volume
and aggregation.
7.6.4 Event Management
Another hypothesis was that the major savings from RR would come from closer integration to
events occurring. Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi emphasize how collaborative
forecasting processes with customers produce excellent supply chain improvements by providing
clarity to market demand, the impact of promotions, pricing events, and advertising.3 However,
during the period tested for the RR pilot, the magnitude of the events was small in comparison.
This section will investigate this hypothesis. Prior to start of the full scale pilot test, one
distribution center was converted to RR and evaluated over a period of time. The volume was
too small to draw conclusions which could be applied to all of P&G, but some lessons were
captured that were useful. The following figure indicates a different color line for each SKU in
scope for this distribution center across a few months of shipments. The y-axis shows the MAPE
- mean average percent error for these SKUs across time.
32 Simchi-Levi, David, Philip Kaminsky, and Edith Simchi-Levi. Designing & Managing the Supply Chain. 2 "d Ed.
McGraw-Hill, 2003.
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Weekly MAPE for RR Skus
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Figure 7.12 Weekly MAPE for set of SKUs, one distribution center
Figure 7.12 shows how for the majority of SKUs, the majority of the time, the error is less than
100% and the bulk of the lines falls under 1. However, certain periods occur where the accuracy
is quite high and it is significant to notice that these peaks tend to occur at the same time across
different products. Notice the peaks around weeks 6, 13, and week 17. Multiple products have
large errors around the same time, indicating that a promotion or event was likely. These errors
contribute more to the overall variability in demand than the weekly amounts. It is also
interesting to see this data weighted for shipment volume as shown in the following figure.
Weekly WAPE for RR Skus
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Figure 7.13 Weekly WAPE for set of SKUs, one distribution center
Figure 7.13 accentuates the behavior seen in Figure 7.3, as with the shipment weights we can see
that the weeks that looked particularly bad in the non-volume weighted error measure are
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exceptionally worse in the volume-weighted measure, indicating that these are also high volume
shipment weeks, thus supporting the hypothesis that an event was occurring in this time frame.
The following figure shows the raw data for this preliminary analysis.
RR DATA FIRST - DP DATA
Data No RR No No DP Data No DP No No RR
WAPE MAPE Points Forecast Shipment Forecast WAPE MAPE Points Forecast Shipment Forecast
WEEK3 15% 27% 27 57 1 24 26% 40% 27 60 20 2
WEEK4 46% 29% 33 71 3 2 35% 37% 33 29 38 9
WEEK5 103% M 39 66 2 2 138% 63% 39 29 28 13
WEEK7 25% 29% 54 40 8 7 48% 39% 54 29 25 1
WEEK8 36% IM 33 68 1 7 37% 56% 33 29 25 22
WEEK9 30% 34% 46 49 7 7 137% 80% 46 29 30 4
WEEK10 42 58 3 6 45% 41% 42 29 29 9
WEEK11 44% 37% 35 56 16 2 57% 54% 35 23 44 7
WEEK12 35% 40% 61 42 3 3 281% 118% 61 23 14 11
WEEK13 53% 44% 46 62 1 0 73% 46% 46 23 35 5
WEEK14 26% 20% 36 67 3 3 81% 49% 36 22 41 10
WEEK15 75% 40% 41 57 9 2 81% 47% 41 22 45 1
WEEK16 137% 40 65 1 3 187% 125% 40 22 34 13
WEEK17 31% 18% 47 57 3 2 65% 42% 47 22 37 3
WEEK18 53% 45% 49 53 6 1 160% 74% 49 22 33 5
WEEK19 36 55 15 3 57% 64% 36 23 44 6
WEEK20 20% 18% 47 57 2 3 40% 32% 47 23 33 6
WEEK21 41% 33% 57 46 3 3 47% 41% 57 23 19 10
WEEK22 60% 54% 54 49 4 2 162% 61% 54 23 29 3
51% 46% 43 57 5 4 93% 58% 43 27 32 7
Figure 7.14 Accuracy metrics for SKUs for one distribution center
Figure 7.14 indicates that a relatively small amount of SKUs (27-61) were contained in the
analysis. The accuracy calculation was conducted for both RR and SAP-FIRST to test the
algorithms. The highlighted sets of data are the only instances where the RR data point had a
higher error than the FIRST data point. These also tend to coincide with the events. As
evaluated in the previous section, larger volumes are expected to balance out the variability and
result in smaller percent error. This was tested in the following chart for a small number of
SKUs for 22 weeks prior to the pilot:
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 62 of 103
Correlate Volume to Error ??
Figure 7.15 Relationship between MAPE and Shipment Volume using SAP-FIRST for a small
subset of pilot data
Figure 7.15 shows little correlation between shipment volume and MAPE. If anything, the trend
would be for error to increase as volume increases. While it may seem unusual for larger
volumes to have higher error, larger volumes are more likely associated with events and
promotions. This graph illustrates how the three points with exceptionally high volume have
average to high forecast error. This perhaps could be driven by promotions.
This assertion can be used to highlight why negligible improvement was measured in forecast
accuracy. The following figure demonstrates the shipment volume for all of the RR SKUs in
scope for the pilot for an extended time period, and draws a box around the period during which
the RR pilot was conducted.
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RR Shipment volume by sku
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Figure 7.16 Weekly volume across SKUs in scope
Figure 7.16 highlights how the volume fluctuates from week to week. In the P&G business
market, it is common for promotions to occur around the end of the fiscal year in June associated
with the "Kids around the world" campaign and desires to meet year end targets. The pilot was
conducted in August through October. The graph highlights how the volume during the period
tested was much more stable with smaller promotional activity in the Pilot Scope period.
7.6.5 Organizational Changes
Another possible reason for the poor performance of RR is the challenge of implementing a new
system which changes the business processes for the organization. Alejandro Lopezmonjardin
studied the three customer service reps using the RR system and the new processes. The metrics
displayed in Figure 7.17 show in general the performance of three customer service
representatives and additionally, the amount of interventions, titled "fine-tuning," each of them
tended to perform. These are easier to see graphically, as shown below.
User I (15% User2 (1% User3 (44%
Summary orders finetuned) orders finetuned) orders finetuned) Total Goal
Service 98.1 98.9 98.8 98.5 97.8
Inventory 18.2 13.9 22.6 17.2 17.0
Productivity index 1.26 0.99 1.45 1.17 1.00
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Figure 7.17 Customer Service Representative Metrics During the RR Pilot33
Productivity Index (RR vs CRP)
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
User1 (15% orders User 2 ( 1% orders User 3 (44% orders Total
finetuned) finetuned) finetuned)
Figure 7.18 Productivity Index across Different Customer Service Representatives
The Productivity Index shown in Figure 7.18 is the ratio of the hours required for the customer
service representative to perform the job using the new system (RR) versus the legacy system
(CRP). Thus, User 2 spends the same amount of time with the new system as with the legacy
system. However, Users 1 and 3 both spend more time with the new system. Thus the users
who make the most interventions to the system, also take longer to perform their roles.
Service Results (% Service)
99.0
98.8
98.6
98.4 -
98.2
97.6
97.4
97.2
97.0
User 1 (15%orders User 2 (1% orders User 3 (44%orders Total
finetuned) finetuned) finetuned)
Figure 7.19 Service Results across Different Customer Service Representatives
Service measures the amount of inventory coverage at the customer's distribution center. The
higher the coverage is, the smaller the chance is for costly out-of-stock occurrences. Here, it is
interesting to note that despite the larger intervention and time spent from Users 1 and 3, it was
User 2 who had the highest customer service.
33 Lopezmonjardin, Alejandro. "RR Leadsite Results: Productivity Tracking" P&G Internal Documentation.
10/10/2005.
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Inventory Results (DOH)
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Figure 7.20 Inventory Results across Different Customer Service Representatives
Inventory Results measures the inventory measured as days on hand (DOH) at the customer's
distribution center. The lower the inventory is, the better the performance is. Again, User 2 has
the highest performance.
The conclusion here is that despite the training efforts and coaching provided, the historical
mindset of the customer service representatives is that they are valued for their interventions.
Historically, customers value this added 'touch' and results are better. However, the
sophisticated RR system was designed to minimize the need for user interface and was intended
to be "exception driven." In the duration of the pilot, it was difficult to impossible to change this
culture and thus it has had an impact on the results. The key learning is that implementing a
system is difficult if people are strongly reluctant to change. A careful plan is necessary to
change the culture and the work process.
7.6.6 Analyzing Errors in RR
Saddled with the organizational data provided above, significant effort was spent trying to
determine the potential behind RR if the organizational challenges could be overcome. Each
week a root cause analysis was conducted reviewing the forecast errors, evaluating the
contributing factors and assigning one of the following reasons:
* New Product - a new work process and training was needed for the VMI analysis, root cause
identified the source of many errors was that the work process was not followed by customer
service representatives, and that they were still adjusting to a new learning curve.
" Promotion - a new process needed to be trained and utilized between P&G and the customer
to account for event data, this process was slow getting up and running, a new learning curve
adjustment took time.
" Variation in movement - unusual demand, unpredicted promotion.
" Shipment Execution - truck not leaving when specified.
" TLB Sizing - rounding to truck size not as system predicted, might be due from strong
promotional activity.
" Customer Data Issue - possible error in customer data.
" Source One Issue - some double counting or data appearing from unknown origin.
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. User Adjustment - manual inputs or change to RR output.
Root Cause for RR Forecast Errors
Customer Data
Issue, 2%
Abnormal Turn
Movement, 11%
TLB
Up/Downsizing, 4% New Product, 36%
Promotion, 30%
\User Adjustment,
5%
Source One Issu ,
4% Shipment
Execution, 8%
Figure 7.21 Distribution of Root Causes for RR Forecast Error
Analyzing the distribution of the types of forecast errors displayed in Figure 7.21 shows that the
majority of the errors occurred from New Product and Promotion categories, which team leads
feel could be improved in the future as work processes are stabilized. This indicates that the
duration of the pilot was not long enough to really test if the RR system could operate more
optimally if the organization were given time to shift.
7.6.7 Plant Interview
Much of the evidence above indicates that the optimal conditions for RR were not met in the trial,
and that by looking at the snapshot, perhaps a large savings might still be possible. However,
discussions with the plant led to the conclusion that the potential was small. The business
chosen to conduct the system trial has a very short cycle time and plans production multiple
times a day. With this system flexibility, their inventory level is not set by forecast error, but
instead by emergency inventory storage in case of a catastrophic event. So the only potential
savings would occur from raw material savings. However, discussions with the plant indicated
that the magnitude of these savings was small in comparison to the cost of implementation at a
single facility. Thus any savings from this site would be overwhelmed by the cost. Additionally,
even if another business could be used, in general the fraction of customers using VMI accounts
for such a small total volume, that even if the accuracy improvement was huge, it might not
result in significant savings overall. For example, if 20% of the volume was able to be perfectly
predicted, but the other 80% was completely unpredictable and subject to wide variations,
aggregating the two might not make much difference to the amount of inventory required to
compensate for the volatility in 80% of the total volume.
Additionally, discussions with the other businesses at P&G with longer cycle times indicated that
the very short 1 to 2 week forecast horizons would not be beneficial to the business due to the
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manufacturing and transit lead time for certain items. Therefore magnitude of the opportunity to
roll out such a system, even if the forecast accuracy improvement had been large, is limited by
the application of VMI, within the businesses with an appropriate cycle time.
7.6.8 Gillette Acquisition
One additional consideration is that simultaneous with the RR Pilot, P&G's acquisition of
Gillette was approved and the organization suddenly had a new priority drawing attention.
Where adequate resources and organizational attention may have brought the cultural change,
and development of a system capable of delivering forecast accuracy improvements at a
reasonable cost, it was not the company's priority at the current period.
7.7 Summary
The development and testing of this new SAP system provided a few valuable lessons.
7.7.1 Improvements Too Costly
The analysis detailed above indicates that RR was directionally better than the current system for
certain horizons and would make a good customer replenishment tool, should the CRP tool need
to be replaced. It provided better turn accuracy, lower inventory levels and higher service levels
for the distribution centers. It also proved that it could integrate event information at a low level
visible through the supply network.
However, the organizational challenges to replacing the current customer service, 'hands-on'
organization with a much more automated tool would require more time and careful handling.
Additionally, RR does not deliver significant enough benefits when compared to the large
development and implementation costs. The implementation cost was much greater than
originally expected due to complex, unique customer processes.
7.7.2 Scope Determination Key
Considerable resources, both financial and personal, were invested over a span of five years at
bringing this system through development and through the test cycle. Some recommendations
for future scope determination could help alleviate the cost of future trials.
* Savings potential analysis - Analysis of the DP forecast accuracy of the pilot scope
conducted before the scope decision was made would have provided an assessment of the
savings potential. In this case, were it known that the business and customer combination
tested had little margin for improvement, another business and customer combination might
have been chosen.
* Business Selection - A business should have been selected which depends on the forecast.
The pilot business does not use the forecast unless it is a significant event. It is only used for
raw material planning. Sites that utilize the forecast more actively as part of production
planning could have provided a better representation of the impact of forecast accuracy
improvements.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 68 of 103
" Timing - A longer trial would allow time to see more representative business swings and
opportunity to collect data and monitor the impact of work process improvements during the
pilot.
* Volume - Improving Visibility will not impact the site until "bigger" customer spikes are
removed. Later reviews determined that the full VMI Customer base would still not have big
enough spikes.
" Opportunity - More detailed analysis into the potential magnitude of improvement. If RR
only improves accuracy up to two weeks out, it will not help sites with a longer than two
week supply chain.
7.7.3 Opportunities for Other Improvement
The study did present some interesting findings which open the door for more questions about
improving forecast accuracy:
" The finding that this particular business and customer have such a high accuracy for such a
relatively small volume indicates that there may be opportunities to learn how this
partnership is so successful and to carry it to other businesses.
" While improvements in accuracy seem capable, the cost of these appears quite high. Are
there cheaper alternatives?
" Opportunity for forecast improvements seems to lie with event forecasting and tying in
information to the system to provide better updates.
" Granular data seems to present its own challenges in how easily a shipment sliding one day
can strongly impact a daily measure. For the work involved at collecting and storing the
additional level of detail, is it worth the additional granularity?
" Manual adjustments to sophisticated computer systems do not seem efficient. This topic will
carry over to the next chapter.
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8 Evaluating the Efficiency of Current Systems
This thesis has demonstrated how sales forecasts are critical to the success of P&G. It has
proposed a method for creating accountability for forecast accuracy within the organization and
has evaluated a proposed system for improving forecast accuracy. While the system proposal
did not prove to be cost effective, the question remains, "How else can we work on improving
forecast accuracy?"
This chapter evaluates a hypothesis from the Global Demand Planning Process Owner, Richard
Clark, that the demand planning process has become so large, and the planners themselves are so
over-worked, that opportunities for efficiency improvements may lay in the historical forecast
data. This idea was partially motivated by the Radio Shack/SAS presentation at the Supply
Chain Forecasting Conference in March 2005 which stressed that "MAPE is an appropriate
metric for evaluating the magnitude of your forecast error......but MAPE is not an appropriate
metric for evaluating the effectiveness of your forecasting process". This chapter will discuss
the motivation behind such a study, the data available and the approach taken to evaluate
efficiencies, the results and subsequent analysis, and finally some conclusions and
recommendations for further improvements.
8.1 Motivation For Efficiency Study
With over 500 demand planners, P&G has one of the largest demand planning organizations
known. Every demand planner interviewed is incredibly busy with their responsibilities and has
little time to be pursuing interests, ideas or analysis that is not required for the organization to
run. These planners work diligently to consolidate information from many different parties
which impact the forecasts on different time horizons. They are responsible for predicting sales
three years out on a SKU basis for different groups of regional customers. They need to keep up
to date through discussions with the account managers to know of changes occurring in the
business and promotions coming, and make sure they are providing the right input to the
organizations which depend on the forecast. So while they have a tremendous amount of
historical data available to them, they have little time to pursue new ideas or mine through
historical data. Additionally, the organization has sufficient turnover with approximately 1/3 of
the demand planners turning over to other jobs within P&G each year. Thus, in many cases by
the time the demand planners are up-to-speed enough to recognize potential areas for
improvement and data analysis that would be warranted, they may be moved on to another
position.
Not only are intense personnel resources invested in forecast accuracy, the information systems
that store and organize the data, and maintain models to predict future behavior are costly.
Additionally, an entire support organization for these systems exists.
3 Harwell, Jack and Michael Gilliland. "Applying Forecast Value Added at Radio Shack." Conference
Presentation at the Institute of Business Forecasting Supply Chain Forecasting Conference, Phoenix, AZ, March 1,
2005.
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When evaluating the magnitude of the resources invested in demand planning, questions arise
about the benefit when weighed against the cost. Other organizations with much leaner demand
planning organizations have been acquired by P&G, so people question if this department is a
competitive advantage enabling P&G to function more efficiently, or if demand planning has
reached the point of diminishing returns where the value of increased forecasting effort is not
worth the associated cost.
8.2 Analytical Approach
To evaluate efficiency, it seems important to have reference data to how efficient other processes
or organizations are with their demand planning. Benchmarking was considered as an option to
comparing demand planning processes and organizations across different companies and
determining some relationship between accuracy and effort and seeing how efficient different
companies compared. However, it quickly became clear that each company has very different
work processes, organizational structures, and methods of measuring and tracking forecast
accuracy. To simplify the analysis and make it as objective as possible, the first approach
undertaken was to compare the demand forecast generated for different businesses within P&G
with each other. Anecdotal discussion with the demand planners indicated that a more
significant amount of time and effort was dedicated to shorter term (weeks to months out)
forecasts relative to longer term (years out) forecasts. Thus efficiency improvements would be
more meaningful if they could be realized for the shorter-term forecast. Further analysis was
conducted by comparing forecast accuracy from P&G business processes with statistical moving
average.
8.2.1 Data Available
P&G information systems store three years of forecast and sales history, by SKU. A SKU is
referred to as a finished product code, or FPC. Sometimes FPCs are combined to form a
demand forecast unit, or DFU. For example, two different SKUs may represent the same size,
same fragrance, of a bottle of hair shampoo, but when the packaging was updated to reflect the
most recent marketing development, the new packaging receives a new SKU or FPC number,
although they fall under the same DFU. A hierarchy exists within the product line and DFUs roll
up based on certain product characteristics (perhaps fragrance, or size) until they roll up typically
into a brand, (for example, Pantene). A few brands may roll up together to make a category (i.e.,
hair care). The first decision was to choose the appropriate level of analysis. As we evaluated
accountability in a previous section, the first analysis was conducted at the category level for all
P&G businesses, to evaluate how different categories compared in their forecast accuracy. For
one business in particular, one brand was investigated for the different types of products sold
under that brand. Eventually, the analysis would reach the DFU level.
Additionally, another key factor in evaluating forecast accuracy is the amount of time in advance
that the forecast is generated. Historical forecast data existed for forecasts generated 1-wk, 2-wk,
3-wk, 4-wk, 6-wk, 8-wk, and 12-wks before the actual sale. Analysis was conducted for each of
these forecast horizons, and eventually as the analysis went into more depth, the horizon was
chosen to match that of the supply chain. In each case, the duration of the forecast was one week.
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Also available in the historical system were forecasts generated at two different points in the
P&G demand planning process. The statistical forecast refers to the forecast generated from the
computer model which evaluates three years of sales history against certain parameters at a SKU
level and predicts future sales. The demand planners are responsible for selecting the
appropriate forecast model used and for updating the parameters. The output from the computer
model, the statisticalforecast, is subsequently updated by the demand planners to include timely
information about merchandising, promotions, special events, or key information from the
account executives. This final forecast is called the independent netforecast and is what is used
by the organizations to make decisions. Both of these forecasts were used in accuracy
calculations.
8.2.2 First Approach: Category Accuracy
The first statistical analysis extracted 52 weeks of forecasts and shipments for over thirty
categories of P&G business. Sample categories included: Antiperspirant/Deodorant, Baby-
wipes, Color Cosmetics, Coffee, Diapers, Feminine Care, Fabric Enhancers, Filtration,
Healthcare, Hair care, Hair color, Laundry, Men's Grooming, Oral Care, Skincare, and Snacks.
The forecast accuracy was determined for both the statistical and independent net forecasts for
each week, for each set of forecast horizons. Forecast accuracy was measured as an index
(actual/forecast) for each of the forecasts. The standard deviation was also determined for the
forecasts across the year. The same analysis was repeated, but measuring forecast accuracy by
WAPE across the 52 weeks.
8.2.3 Second Approach: Accuracy of product forms within a brand
The second statistical analysis took one category and delved into one brand in particular. One
brand may be sold in different forms, and the same analysis as depicted in 8.2.2 First Approach:
Category Accuracy was conducted, but for a lower level in the product hierarchy.
8.2.4 Third Approach: DFU level accuracy within a category
Lastly, 52 weeks of forecast and shipment history were extracted for each DFU within a category.
This was only conducted for one forecast horizon, and an appropriate horizon was chosen to
match the average length of the supply chain for the associated category. For example, laundry
has a short supply chain and a 1-week forecast horizon was used, where-as a longer horizon was
used for baby-wipes. For each DFU, the WAPE was calculated across the 52-weeks for both the
statistical and independent-net forecasts. In addition, a simple moving average was calculated
for each week based on four weeks of data. To match the horizon, the four weeks of historical
data used, were taken from the number of weeks back to match the corresponding P&G process
forecast horizon. So if the P&G process accuracy analysis used the forecast from four weeks out,
the moving average was calculated based on the average of data points from eight to four weeks
out.
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8.3 Analytical Results and Interpretation
The analytical approach discussed above generated a large amount of data. A few tables and
extracts are included below to illustrate the findings and how they led to subsequent analysis.
8.3.1 Category Level : Forecast Index
The category analysis first gave a measure of forecast accuracy for different time horizons.
Figure 8.1 indicates an example of an analysis. Each category is disguised for confidentiality.
The index is presented where the closer to 100% the more accurate the forecast. If the
percentage is over 100%, the shipments exceeded the forecast. If the percentage is less than
100%, the forecast exceeded the shipment. The greater the standard deviation is, the higher the
variability is in the forecast accuracy index. Thus a low standard deviation and a high
percentage would indicate that the category was consistently over-shipped.
Independent Net
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5
Category 6
Category 7
Category 8
Category 9
Category 10
Category 11
Category 12
Category 13
Category 14
Category 15
Category 16
Category 17
Category 18
Category 19
Category 20
Category 21
Category 22
Category 23
Category 24
Category 25
Category 26
Category 27
Category 28
Category 29
Category 30
Category 31
Category 32
Average
104%
97%
77%
95%
95%
98%
86%
98%
97%
96%
98%
110%
96%
100%
103%
110%
96%
104%
92%
102%
91%
95%
98%
102%
57%
93%
105%
92%
85%
103%
100%
101%
Stdev
32%
18%
27%
23%
24%
20%
48%
18%
18%
16%
19%
56%
21%
24%
86%
22%
15%
45%
28%
26%
21%
19%
27%
21%
54%
17%
32%
21%
22%
22%
18%
17%
Figure 8.1 Forecast accuracy index across 52-weeks
Statistical
Average Stdev
149% 43%
113% 20%
128% 41%
102% 20%
128% 31%
112% 24%
100% 49%
105% 19%
102% 19%
103% 17%
102% 21%
108% 45%
198% 17%
112% 20%
103% 86%
117% 23%
101% 16%
118% 40%
96% 28%
102% 25%
122% 30%
105% 21%
99% 22%
108% 20%
60% 58%
102% 17%
123% 42%
131% 29%
89% 25%
123% 25%
109% 23%
104% 17%
of data for a particular forecast horizon.
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 73 of 103
From this analysis, we saw that in almost every category, for every set of forecast horizon
(number of weeks out the forecast was generated) the statistical indices were larger than the
independent net. This indicates that the statistical forecast generated by the computer model
predicted fewer shipments than the independent net; and that the manual process was overall
increasing the weekly forecasts. Also noticed was that standard deviation tended to be larger in
the statistical model. Looking at the confidence intervals represented by the outlier box plots
shown below, the confidence interval for standard deviation is lower and tighter for the
independent net forecast.
~idpndent Not- ts St Ia
079
0,8-'
0.7-
0.2- 0,62
0.5.2
0.1- 0.1
This indicates that the manual adjustments by demand planners were overall producing less
variable error.
These trends can more easily be seen by averaging the data across
in the following figure:
all of the categories as shown
Forecast Accuracy Index
Averaged Across Categories
Weekly Time Buckets - Year Avg
Independent Net
Fcst Date Average Stdev
1-week 97% 27%
2-week 97% 27%
3-week 94% 27%
4-week 93% 27%
6-week 93% 26%
8-week 93% 27%
12-week 94% 27%
Figure 8.2: Forecast Accuracy Index for Independent
Statistical
Average Stdev
112% 29%
112% 29%
109% 29%
108% 28%
108% 28%
108% 28%
108% 28%
Net versus Statistical Forecasting
This analysis was quite interesting, and clearly shows that the statistical averages were
consistently higher than the independent net averages. Again, this shows that the statistical
forecasts generated by the computer model tend to under-predict sales; while the adjustments
made to create the independent net forecast tend to over-predict sales. This indicates that the
statistical forecast has a bias that it always under-predicts sales, perhaps this could be accounted
for by the lack of last minute promotion or event data in the statistical forecast. Another
possibility is that the planners adjust parameters to force the forecast to under-predict sales
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leaving room to add market intelligence. The independent net forecast has an apparent bias to
over-predict sales, indicating that the adjustments made tend to be larger than necessary.
Reviewing the standard deviation between the two forecasts indicates only a slight improvement
in variability in the independent net versus the statistical forecast.
The other interesting finding by this analysis is shown when reviewing the accuracy and standard
deviation across the forecast horizons. Standard theory would predict that as the actual date of
shipment is approached, the forecast should become more accurate. While we can see this in the
independent net forecast as the indices reach closer to 100% as the forecast horizon shortens,
looking at the statistical forecast we see different behavior where the forecast accuracy decreases
as we get closer to the actual ship date.
These findings impact business planning decisions, but provided limited insight possible
efficiency improvements. Another analysis was conducted by drilling into a brand in particular.
8.3.2 Product Level Within Brand : Forecast Index
The first approach was repeated for a particular brand within the laundry business of P&G.
Laundry can come in different forms such as liquid, powder, or tablets and therefore different
levels of this brand were analyzed to examine the forecast accuracy behavior. Most of the
behaviors at the aggregate level were repeated at this smaller increment. The following figure
represents a snapshot of this analysis:
1 week Fcst 2 week Fcst 3 week Fcst
Independent Net Statistical Independent Net Statistical Independent Net Statistical
Average Stdev Average Stdev Average Stdev Average Stdev Average Stdev Average Stdev
97% 15% 105% 19% 98% 15% 105% 19% 98% 16% 104% 19%
97% 17% 108% 22% 98% 17% 108% 22% 99% 18% 108% 22%
107% 35% 118% 32% 110% 36% 119% 33% 111% 36% 121% 32%
71% 78% 67% 75% 73% 73%
83% 48% 110% 59% 95% 63% 112% 60% 105% 58% 130% 70%
14% 33% 15% 37% 14% 34% 16% 37% 15% 35% 16% 37%
15% 37% 15% 36% 15% 36% 15% 35% 15% 36% 15% 35%
Diff Avg Diff Stdev
8% 4%
12% 5%
11%
27% 11%
2% 4%
Diff Avg Diff Stdev
7% 4%
10% 5%
9%M
17%
1% 2%
Diff Avg Diff Stdev
6% 3%
9% 4%
10%
24% 12%
1% 2%
*** Red cells indicate that the statistical forecast is better than the independent net forecast
Figure 8.3: Forecast Accuracy for Statistical and Independent Net forecasts generated for
different product types within a brand
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Figure 8.3 demonstrates the same behavior that was displayed at the category level, across the
different forecast horizon. This shows again that statistical forecasts tend to under-predict sales,
with a couple exceptions; whereas the independent net forecasts tend to over-predict sales, or at
least predict higher sales than the statistical forecast generated.
With this smaller subset of data, we can see that there is a large error associated with the last two
product lines analyzed. Both of these have indices less than 20%, which indicates that actual
sales were much more than anticipated. Perhaps something unusual was occurring in the brand
for those product lines. With a few anomalous data points aggregated into the total picture as
these are, the summary for the brand may be significantly impacted. This is shown in the
following figure.
Forecast Accuracy Index
Determined for LND-Tide & Averaged
Weekly Time Buckets - Year Avg
Independent Net Statistical
Fcst Date Average Stdev Average Stdev
1-week 69% 38% 79% 34%
2-week 71% 40% 79% 34%
3-week 74% 39% 82% 36%
4-week 74% 39% 85% 34%
6-week 70% 35% 86% 31%
8-week 65% 34% 86% 31%
12-week 70% 38% 86% 30%
Figure 8.4 Forecast Accuracy aggregated at the product line with a brand level
Figure 8.4 demonstrates that while the majority of the product lines within the brand may be
under-forecast (indices above 100%), once the two product lines are included, the entire brand
appears to have a gross over-forecast bias, which is created from a small segment of the brand.
To better account for the relative size of the contributing products, another analysis was
performed using a forecast accuracy metric popular at P&G, weighted-average percent error, or
WAPE.
8.3.3 Products Level Within Brand : Forecast WAPE
P&G commonly uses the forecast error metric, WAPE, when evaluating performance. WAPE
reviews the absolute difference between the forecast and the actual shipments, and calculates the
error as a percent of total volume. Thus the higher the WAPE is, the higher the percent error is
and the worse the forecast performance is. The year's worth of statistical and independent net
forecast history for the same brand outlined in section 8.3.2 Product Level Within Brand:
Forecast Index was evaluated against WAPE.
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1 week Fcst
Indp Net Stat
Average Average
8% 14%
10% 18%
30% 29%
15% 10%
11% 11%
Diff Avg
6%
8%
2 week Fcst
Indp Net Stat
Average Average
8% 14%
11% 17%
30% 30%
13% 11%
12% 12%
Diff Avg
6%
7%
0%
3 week Fcst
Indp Net Stat
Average Average
8% 13%
11% 17%
30% 31%
13% 10%
11% 11%
Diff Avg
5%
6%
1%
4 week Fcst
Indp Net Stat
Average Average
9% 13%
11% 17%
31% 32%
11% 11%
12% 12%
Diff Avg
4%
5%
1%
*.. Shaded cells indicate that the statistical forecast is better than the
independent net forecast
Figure 8.5: Weighted-Average Percent Error for a set of product lines within a brand for P&G
This time, the larger the number is, the worse the error is. WAPE does not indicate bias and
whether or not a forecast is above or below the actual shipments. Instead, the conclusion we can
draw from this analysis is that the independent net forecasts on a whole appear to be very close
or slightly better than the statistical forecasts, with the exception of the product line which is
second from the bottom. Here, it appears that the manual adjustments being made to the
statistical forecast are creating more error as opposed to if the forecast had just been left alone.
Averaging across the product lines for the brand, the following summary chart was obtained:
Forecast Accuracy WAPE
Determined for LND-TIDE & Averaged
Weekly Time Buckets - Averaged over a year
Fcst Date
1-week
2-week
3-week
4-week
6-week
8-week
12-week
Independent Net
Average
22%
25%
24%
25%
17%
20%
19%
Statistical
Average
89%
90%
94%
94%
32%
32%
32%
Figure 8.6: Weighted-Average Percent Error averaged
brand.
across the product lines for a particular
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Figure 8.6 demonstrates that the forecasts are generally much better following the adjustments
made to the statistical output. The statistical errors appear rather large. Another unusual finding
is that the error tends to increase closer to the actual shipment date. Again, it is hard to
determine what is contributing to this effect, as perhaps new event only products are added to the
forecast close to the ship date.
These analyses provide interesting insights into forecast accuracy. However, global demand
planning experts suggested using the metric WAPE aggregated to a business category. This is
examined in the next section.
8.3.4 Category: Forecast WAPE
The weighted-average percent error was calculated for each week across an entire category, for
each possible forecast horizon. This was repeated for each category. Averaging across the
categories gives the following data:
Forecast Accuracy WAPE
Determined for Category & Averaged
Weekly Time Buckets - Averaged over a year
Independent Net Statistical
Fcst Date Average Average
1-week 20% 38%
2-week 20% 38%
3-week 20% 38%
4-week 21% 38%
6-week 21% 38%
8-week 21% 38%
12-week 24% 38%
Figure 8.7: Weighted-Average Percent Error for different forecast horizons averaged across
P&G categories.
Figure 8.7 demonstrates that the manual process executed by the demand planners generates a
forecast that has much lower percent error than the statistical output. However, it might also
indicate an opportunity to update the statistical models to generate more accurate output.
The WAPE was calculated for each category type of forecast across the period of a year. This
also prompted the idea to compare the statistical and independent net forecasts with a simple
statistical representation, the moving average. This analysis was conducted for the one-week
forecast horizon, as this is where both the independent net and statistical forecasts have the
greatest accuracy. The moving average was calculated by averaging four weeks of data leading
to the forecast period. The results are depicted in the following figure:
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1-week WAPE
3
2.5+Independent Net
Statistical
2 - Moving Avg-
CL2 42
15
0.5 \
Category
Figure 8.8: Weighted-Average Percent Error for three different types of forecasts generated for
different business categories. These are determined for a year worth of history, and a one-week
forecast horizon.
Figure 8.8 shows an interesting finding. For most categories, the statistical forecast clearly
generates the highest error. In fact, there only appears to be one category where the statistical
forecast does not generate the most error. The independent net forecast appears to be
significantly better than the statistical forecast for many categories, indicating the value of the
personal step in the demand planning process. The most interesting finding is the accuracy of
the moving average forecast compared with the other two forecasts generated from the P&G
demand planning process. Here, we can see that in a number of cases the moving average is
better than the independent net forecast, although it does not have the business intelligence that
the P&G process supplies. It might appear that replacing the P&G demand planning process
with a simple moving average for very short forecast horizons would reduce the effort required
to generate these forecasts. However, category level planning at this short interval is not useful
to many people in the business. At the short time interval, forecasts are more useful and drive
the business at a SKU level. Additionally, the one-week forecast horizon may be too short for
some businesses which have longer processes. Therefore, the next analysis seeks to understand
better if this trend continues to a lower level, by choosing a set of categories, and evaluating the
accuracy at a SKU level for a time horizon in line with the average cycle time for the business.
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8.3.5 DFU level accuracy within a category
To delve into the possibility that a moving average forecast might be very accurate relative to
current processes, a year's worth of forecast and shipment history for a particular category was
extracted at the demand forecast unit, DFU, level. Chapter 4 explained that a DFU represents a
SKU, or a set of nearly identical SKUs that are forecast as a group. This is the smallest forecast
unit at P&G. For the category, an appropriate forecast horizon was chosen which would be the
appropriate length to provide a forecast in the right time frame to be able to have an impact on
the supply chain. For each SKU, the WAPE was calculated for a year's worth of data for the
statistical, independent net, and moving average forecasts. Below are a series of charts showing
the distribution of SKUs based on how the independent net forecast compares to the statistical
forecast. These are evaluated for three different P&G categories.
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Figure 8.9: Distribution of SKU performance for the statistical versus the independent net
forecast for three categories.
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Figure 8.9 determines the number of WAPE percentage point improvement between the
independent net and statistical forecasts. A certain pattern emerges that the majority of products
fall in the range where the independent net and statistical WAPEs are within 25 percentage
points of each other. The appearance of SKUs at the left of the graphs indicates that the net
independent forecast does much better than the statistical forecast. The numbers of SKUs on the
right of the chart show that there are products out there where the adjustments made to the
statistical forecast are not improving the situation.
Also of interest, was comparing the independent net forecast with a moving average forecast.
The moving average was calculated by averaging four weeks worth of shipments going back
from the time to match the forecast horizon. Then the moving average forecast error, measured
by WAPE, was then compared to the forecast error for the statistical and independent-net
forecasts. The analysis is demonstrated for three categories below:
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Figure 8.10: Distribution of SKU performance for the independent net versus the moving
average forecast.
Figure 8.10 indicates that the independent net forecast significantly outperforms the moving
average for a large number of SKUs. However, there are still a relatively large number of SKUs
that fall into the category where the moving average outperforms the independent net forecast.
To understand this better, a few theories were tested to break the analysis down by different
product types. One differentiating factor is a category referred to a CSU, which is a complex
ship unit typically produced for a one-time promotion, and not a lasting product. Removing the
CSU from the analysis showed the same general trend as shown in the graphs above. The only
difference was noticed when looking at the CSUs alone as shown in the figure below:
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Figure 8.11: CSU
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Figure 8.11 shows how the CSUs tend to have independent net forecasts which are more accurate
than the statistical forecast. More individual attention and planning are required for these one-
time use SKUs, which may only be sold for a short period of time.
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Figure 8.12: CSU comparison of Net Independent Forecast versus Moving Average Forecast
Figure 8.12 shows how the CSUs also tend to have less error independent net forecast, when
compared to the moving average forecast. However, there are still a significant number of SKUs
that have a moving average forecast which is much better than the independent net. Another
differentiating factor considered was the volume associated with each SKU.
To further investigate a reason why different SKUs fall into different categories, each SKU was
assigned an "A", "B," or "C" depending on the annual volume of shipments. The "A" SKUs
represent approximately 80% of the shipping volume, though are only a smaller fraction of the
SKUs. The "B" SKUs are the next 15% of the shipping volume, while the "C" SKUs are the
remaining 5% of the shipping volume. This further segregation was applied to the net
independent forecast versus the statistical forecast. This can be seen in the figure below for two
of the categories.
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Figure 8.13: ABC analysis for comparing independent net forecast error with statistical forecast
error for two categories.
Figure 8.13 shows essentially the same trend as before, without any obvious trend changes due to
the category. The "A", "B", and "C" SKUs seem to be dispersed across the charts and no
generalizations were able to be made.
The same analysis was conducted on the net independent forecast versus the moving average
comparison. This is shown in the following figure:
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Figure 8.14: Examples of ABC comparison of Net Independent Forecast versus Moving
Average Forecast for two different P&G categories
In the top graph, Figure 8.14 shows that the "C" SKUs, which represent a smaller volume,
represent a large number of the cases where the independent net forecast is much more accurate
than the moving average forecast. Some "C" SKUs have the opposite behavior where the
moving average is much better than the independent net. Thus no overall conclusions are
possible and the SKUs need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Additionally the "A" SKUs
still seem to appear on the side where the moving average forecast has less error than the
independent net.
8.4 Summary and Recommendations
Review of this analysis indicates some key conclusions with respect to evaluating forecast
efficiency. The level of product hierarchy at which the analysis is conducted can lead to
different conclusions. For example, at the category level the independent net forecast appeared
to have consistently higher error than the statistical forecast. However, when evaluating
forecasts at a SKU level, many SKUs had statistical forecasts that was as good, or even better,
than the independent net forecasts. Thus, it is important to understand the objective and potential
impacts of an evaluation and choose the appropriate level for the analysis.
Aggregated analysis shows that independent net forecasts provide value and are capable of
reducing error over the statistical forecasts. SKU-level analysis identifies opportunities for
improvement. For example, simple moving average forecasts seem relatively accurate. I left
spreadsheet tools and directions to repeat this analysis as necessary for other categories. These
tools generate lists of the SKUs which can be reviewed by people closer to the business
operation. The next step would be for a business expert to analyze what efficient SKUs have in
common, and whether lessons can be captured and extended from one business to another.
This chapter demonstrates the challenges in performing an efficiency study, yet indicates the
opportunities that exist for forecasts generated using less personal interaction to be relatively
accurate. So while a previous chapter found that a potential method for improving forecast was
not cost effective, redistributing effort between the SKUs may be able to provide efficient
improvements.
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9 Organizational and Process Challenges
While the thesis has presented an interesting analysis, it is important to consider the context of
the study, and the impact of P&G's organization on the findings and ability to impact change.
This chapter will review the organization through three different perspectives, or lenses:
strategic, political and cultural. Lastly, the chapter will evaluate the work discussed in the thesis
within this organizational context.
9.1 Strategic Lens
A review through the strategic lens begins with an assessment of organizational goals and the
organizational design to accomplish this strategy. Subsequently, the impact of the strategy on
the work conducted for this thesis will be reviewed.
9.1.1 P&G Corporate Strategy
The 2005 annual report explains the company's strategy in the words of the CEO35.
"P&G's strategies remain unchanged. We are continuing to focus on core
businesses and on P&G's leading brands, countries, and customers. We are
continuing to build P&G leadership in the faster-growing, higher-margin beauty
and health care businesses. We are continuing to invest in growth with lower-
income consumers in developing markets. I'm confident these remain the right
choices for sustained growth."
In essence, these comments point to a focus on building size, maintaining strong brand
leadership positions, growing into new markets and building higher margin businesses. These
comments do not point to the overarching strategy, but instead are really methods of
accomplishing their main goal, which is dominance of the consumer market place.
P&G's short-term operational strategies are aligned around meeting this long term goal of
dominating the consumer market globally. Their focus on growing size and dominance leads to
increasing market share in the primary categories. Increasing size leads to economies of scale as
their business can spread the cost of fixed assets and advertising across more products, and use
size to leverage efficiency in relationships with other parties in the channel. These economies of
scale lead to lower unit costs, resulting in greater profitability and thus larger budgets. This
allows P&G to invest heavily into research to understand consumer needs, to develop and bring
new products to market, and to improve marketing to increase awareness and consumer demand.
This theory is substantiated by the identification of P&G's core strengths in the annual report as
being branding, innovation, go-to-market, and scale. Essentially the first two strengths represent
the marketing and product development focus, and the last two represent the efficiencies from
35 P&G Annual Report 2005.
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scale, especially in their go-to-market capabilities. This strategy creates a virtuous cycle 3 6,
whereby increasing market share leads to lower costs, and thus higher profits, allowing for
investment into research and development and improved marketing, driving further increases in
demand. Applying system dynamics to represent this behavior, Vensim ® demonstrates this
cycle is shown in the figure below:
~Market Share -
Consumer Economies of
Demand Scale
Improved Marketing and
New Product Profitability
Development
Figure 9.1 Virtuous cycle of dominating the consumer product marketplace
Thus, driven to dominate the consumer product market, Figure 9.1 demonstrates how P&G has
become so successful and where it focuses its efforts. An excerpt from the annual report
highlights this importance. 37-
"[We are focusing on] industry leadership that enables growth. Leadership is
important because it creates opportunities to grow, to sustain growth over the long
term, and to earn superior returns from consistent growth. P&G aspires to be the
leading consumer products company in sales, profitability, market capitalization,
shareholder return, and - particularly important - in each of our core strengths.
We are creating sustainable leadership advantages in branding, innovation, go-to-
market capability, and scale - and we aspire to be the industry best in each area."
P&G thus places strategic importance on marketing and new product development, while also
enabling sales and lowering costs from capturing economies of scale, thus funneling money back
into increasing demand through marketing and new product development.
Following these strategies, P&G has reorganized to most efficiently operate along these
principles. The organizational structure outlined in Chapter 2 is designed to synergize the core
activities of a brand - product development, marketing and product supply - globally in GBUs,
while capturing the economies of scale across product lines locally in MDOs. See figure below:
36 Sterman, John. Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. McGraw-Hill, 2000.
3 P&G Annual Report 2005.
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II
Figure 9.2 P&G Organizational Design
For example, product improvements and brand marketing can be applied globally, thus global
brand organizations are more efficient. Local market development organizations are efficient to
allow P&G to leverage local market knowledge and relationships with customers on a regional
basis. This segregation of responsibility and budgets all the way up to the CEO level allows
organizations to focus on these goals with minimal conflict. Essentially, this explains how
P&G's corporate strategy has influenced the organizational design.
Another benefit from the organizational design is the ability to quickly integrate other companies
into the organization. P&G's growth strategy is operationally achieved not only through organic
growth, but also through numerous acquisitions of varying sizes. The organizational design
allows for other organizations to be assimilated into P&G easily by either rolling up similar
businesses into business units, or by creating new business units for new business ventures. The
MDOs are already accustomed to supplying a diverse set of products to customers regionally,
and can add the new products to the portfolio efficiently.
9.1.2 Impact of P&G Strategy on Projects
The strategies discussed above provide a context for the environment in which this work was
conducted. For example, P&G's strategy of growth through acquisition leads to the importance
of developing flexible processes. Chapter 6 discussed the design of a statistical process to set
forecast accuracy metrics and create accountability throughout the organization. At the same
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time that the design work was underway, the acquisition of Gillette was approved. Thus
throughout the design process, flexibility was built into the model to allow for changing numbers
of business units, setting metrics with limited history, and updating easily as large changes were
anticipated. This also emphasizes the importance for projects to be simple and easy to
implement. The forecast trial discussed in Chapter 7 was conducted while the planning for the
Gillette acquisition. This could serve as a resource drain for the MDOs which are responsible for
sales and distribution of product to the customers regionally, and would be taking on
responsibility for Gillette products soon.
At a higher level, the importance of the primary strategy highlighted in Figure 9.1 is also
reflected in the project work. Attention is drawn to forecast accuracy as it is cited as the reason
for many costs in the business. For example, work by another P&G intern evaluated the
financial value of P&G's inventory, and then looked at benchmarking this to other companies. A
major cause for inventory is safety stock to account for variability in demand. To improve
efficiency and reduce costs, forecast accuracy needs to be improved. Therefore, attention to
forecast accuracy stems from P&G's core strategy as forecast accuracy is viewed an opportunity
for cost savings.
Another part of P&G's core strategy is leveraging size to capture economies of scale. Hence,
P&G creates horizontal process networks and global process organizations which facilitate the
standardization of processes globally and the rapid sharing of important lessons and system
improvements. While Chapter 7 discusses a trial for one customer, one category, in North
America, it was important to keep the perspective of how this would extrapolate to the rest of the
company. This necessitated having discussions with global experts, people from different
regions and businesses to understand unique situations and how applicable project lessons would
be to the rest of the business. For example, while the RR system in theory seemed like a great
opportunity, the cycle times and needs of other businesses in P&G decreased the savings
potential on total rollout to the company. This importance on leveraging lessons across regions
as efficiently as possible led to a time pressure for the forecast accuracy metric rollout discussed
in Chapter 6. When a cost-saving initiative was planned, rapid deployment was considered a
strategic strength of P&G and demanded from projects.
P&G's size is not only leveraged in organizational efficiencies, but also through improving
service to other parties in the supply chain. For example, P&G supplies such a large quantity of
products (estimated to be 5% of Wal-Mart's volume) that investments in strengthening these
relationships to simplify the supply chain pay for themselves in reduced cost, increased
efficiency and reduced out of stocks. This was a direct motivator for the project discussed in
Chapter 7. Here, the information sharing between P&G and its customer using Vendor Managed
Inventory was used to reduce costs and improve systems for both P&G and the customer
distribution center. While this project did not prove successful, it was aligned with the overall
strategy of P&G and other ventures in similar areas are likely to be pursued in the future.
Lastly, the organizational design created to enable P&G's goals formally separated the demand
and supply organizations. As seen previously in Figure 9.2, the people responsible for the
demand forecast and the people who are impacted by it in the supply organization do not meet
until the highest levels of the organization. While this design is efficient for the overall
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operations of P&G, it leads to projects such as that discussed in Chapter 6 to drive accountability
through the system. Thus General Managers who reside in the GBUs will be held accountable
for their forecast accuracy, although the forecast is generated by personnel within the regional
MDOs.
9.2 Political Lens
As the previous discussion highlighted the overall strategy of P&G and how this impacted the
project work, the organizational design and strategy have created a political system which also
affects project work. This section will investigate the interests and power of different
stakeholders within the organization, and how this impacted the project.
9.2.1 P&G Corporate Politics
Interpersonal relationships are key to successful operation of P&G businesses. This is driven by
a number of factors including P&G's "promote from within" mantra and the organizational
design. P&G has a strict policy of only hiring at the entry level. As people reach higher levels
of the organization, they unanimously have had extensive experience operating within the
company. This policy leads to the average employee having a significant history at P&G. With
the average years of working at P&G being quite high, it is likely that people will work together
at multiple points along their career. Additionally, as relationships build over time, an informal
network connects employees across organizations. These relationships are seen as a strategic
advantage and even written about in the annual report:
"In addition, there is an intangible but important benefit that comes from P&G's
"promote from within" culture. The men and women working in the GBUs and
MDOs often know each other because they've spent their entire careers at P&G.
They're focused on the same purpose. They have similar values. They've had
similar career experiences. This strengthens their ability to debate issues, make
decisions and execute with excellence.38"
This excerpt indicates that even though employees may be separated by function within the
hierarchy of the organization, these relationships enable collaboration and grease the processes in
place. Understanding the importance of relationships, next the relative sources of power will be
discussed.
One source of power within the organization is tenure. The "promote from within" policy
creates an interesting dynamic within the organization, and that's the importance placed on the
number of years an employee has worked for the company. The more years of service an
employee has, the more respect they command from their peers. Respect can also be obtained by
people with less experience, but this is harder to earn. When teams form, or groups come
together for a meeting, introductions always include the 'years of service' at P&G. In many of
the meetings attended, the years of service were in the twenty-thirty range.
38 P&G Annual Report 2004.
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Another source of power within the organization is the department represented. Anecdotally,
many employees commented that P&G is really a "marketing company" and that decisions are
primarily driven by marketing. Another comment indicated that "the organization is aligned
around marketing and consumer knowledge." This dynamic also plays into the functional
organizational structure. Business general managers are groomed through the marketing
organization. Additionally, Marketing is the fastest promotion path within the organization, and
is referred to as an "up or out" function. Thus, having a marketing person on a team could have
an interesting impact on the dynamics. This person has the potential to rise quickly through the
organization to a leadership position, thus their relative power on a team might be higher. On the
other hand, the rapid turnover in these positions presents another challenge. While Marketing
has been used as an example of how power is derived from the function of the organization, this
also extends to other functions within P&G. I would hypothesize the GBU and MDO
organizations have higher relative power by association than the GBS unit. It appears that
business really drives GBS services such as information technology, as opposed to having the
information technology drive business change.
Lastly, two other factors appear to contribute to power within the organization: position, and
closeness to the customer. Positional authority is deemed from the relative place of people in the
corporate structure. While recommendations may be carefully framed, important decisions were
left to higher levels in the organization, and respect was always shown for authority. However,
people did not seem to wield structural power. Information and respect flowed in both directions.
Less importance seemed to be shown to people's relative place in the hierarchy, as opposed to
their years of service. The other factor which could be drawn on for power, and input to decision
making, was proximity to the customer. With the strategy of leadership brands and high service,
people in roles with a direct impact on the final product or sales demanded attention.
The "promote from within" strategy may appear challenged by the strategy of growth by
acquisition. For example, in 2004 Gillette had approximately 29,000 employees. Folding this
organization into P&G will prove a cultural challenge, as Gillette employees tend to have more
diverse backgrounds. Thus the sources of power may be changing with the latest acquisition.
Having reviewed power and relationships within the organization, the impact of these on the
project work will now be discussed.
9.2.2 Impact of P&G Politics on Projects
The importance of relationships in the organization, coupled with the demand planning function
operating in the MDO, but affecting the GBUs, heightened the importance of working with other
people for this research. Fortunately, my supervisor commanded organizational respect due to
his long tenure, functional excellence in demand planning, and global leadership role. Thus,
some credibility was possible as any analysis would pass through him. Additionally, he
identified the key organizational players for the project work, and provided an introduction to
enable relationship-building. For example, critical to the success of the forecast accuracy
accountability project outlined in chapter 5 was top-down leadership from the executive level,
and buy-in from the MDO and GBU organizations. Having no experience with the company,
and essentially no organizational power, my ability to drive the project's success hinged on the
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shoulders of the key players involved. Throughout the process, input was sought from the global
demand planning experts, and especially the North American Demand Planning Manager. Being
a relationship-based enterprise, the MDO regional managers had a tight network and
communication flowed easily. North America represents half of the business of P&G, and its
size and proximity to headquarters leaves this a powerful position within the regions. Therefore,
obtaining the input, buy-in and support from the North American lead gave the project credibility
earlier with the remote regions.
P&G's organizational politics also deserves a brief discussion on its relevance to the demand
planning process. As indicated in Chapter 4, demand planners turn over on average every three
years, leaving a high percentage of the demand planners new to the role at any given time.
Additionally, input to the demand plan comes from multiple parts of the organization. Marketing,
and Consumer Market Knowledge provide input based on the expected effects of advertising and
new product design on consumer demand. Meanwhile, account executives from the sales
organization work closely with the customers and have foresight to planned promotions and
events at a customer level. To justify advertising spending, Marketing needs to point to a high
expected impact on demand. Additionally, sales representatives want to ensure that product is
available on the shelf for the consumers to purchase. Thus, both of these organizations have an
incentive to predict sales which will be higher than actual, although the cost of excess inventory
at P&G, a main result from over-predicting sales, would not impact either of their organizations.
As these branches have relatively higher power in the organizational framework, it takes a
demand planner who has excellent interpersonal skills and the ability to hold their ground in the
demand planning process, analyzing the input from different parties in light of their incentives.
Incentives also exist to under-predict demand so that the business is seen as exceeding
expectation.
9.3 Cultural Lens
While the strategy and politics set an important part of the organizational context for the project,
the analysis would not be complete with a review of the strong P&G corporate culture.
9.3.1 P&G Corporate Culture
P&G has a very strong corporate culture, cultivated by its "promote from within" policies and
selective hiring process. Carefully controlling the hiring of people into the organization to be a
good fit for P&G's culture, and then only promoting people from these entry level positions,
serves multiple purposes. One, the hiring process includes a personality test and ensures that
people selected are likely to succeed and fit within the P&G culture. Second, the "promote from
within" organization starts all new hires at entry level positions; therefore, if someone makes it
through the hiring process who happens to be a bad fit for the organization, they are held to the
lowest levels and will not likely progress through the organization. Additionally, the "promote
from within" culture gives P&G years to mold and shape each new employee, so that by the time
people reach managerial level, they have been indoctrinated into the P&G culture. These
policies support a strong corporate culture.
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While I can not speak to exactly what the P&G personality test is looking for in new employees,
a certain consistency was evident in the employees. In my work at P&G I met one of the most
outwardly diverse groups of people. P&G managed to attract employees from all different
diversity categories - race, ethnicity, citizenship, gender, religious affiliation. I never expected
to hear so many accents at the P&G corporate headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio. However, while
so many of the employees came from such different backgrounds, there was a uniformity of
personality amongst the people. In general, I found employees to be intelligent, hard-working,
loyal, outgoing, personable, friendly, ambitious, and relatively conservative. Across the board,
all of the employees I worked with were very driven, putting in long hours to keep ahead of their
busy schedules, and outwardly motivated to ensure their project's success. While everyone was
quite driven, it was also an environment where all of the employees were very friendly, easy to
get along with, and very personable. In essence, P&G employees all tend to have the salesman
quality of being able to engage people, tell a good story, and keep the interactions fun. Even
when interacting with career statisticians or production workers, who might have the stereotype
as being less extroverted, these people were incredibly warm and engaging. Creating a staff of
hard-working yet personable employees enables P&G to accomplish significant goals through
their relationships, as this type of person is likely to be motivated to push the company ahead, yet
be pleasant enough to build positive networks and relationships across the organization.
The value of loyalty deserves an entire section to itself. P&G encourages this loyalty through
their "promotion from within" policy, and their excellent benefits, especially their profit sharing
plan. Under P&G's profit-sharing plan, originally set up in 1887, US employees receive 5% to
25% of their salary in P&G stock, as their annual retirement savings. Fostering employee loyalty
and a sense of ownership in the company, the plan doesn't even require employee
contributions. 39 What's more astounding, is that media reports between 87 and 95% of
employees' retirement plans are invested in P&G stock." 1 The numbers demonstrate how
employees back up their faith in P&G to continue to prosper and deliver significant return with
significant investment. This loyalty even survived a tumultuous period under CEO Dirk Jaeger,
when, on March 7, 2000, P&G stock fell 30 percent. This crash is evident in the figure below:
39 Nelson, Emily. "Could A Bear Market Hurt Your Retirement?" Wall Street Journal Online. Accessed 3/15/2006.
http://www.careerjournal.com/myc/retirement/20000414-nelson.html
40 Zall, Milton. "Too much stock in one basket?" Today's Chemist February 2002. Vol 11, No. 2, pp 77-78.
41 Fox News. "Employees Beware: Company-Stock 401(k) Plans Not Wise Investments" Friday January 18, 2002.
Accessed 3/15/2006. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,29 3 3,4 3 35 3 ,00.html
Christy Prilutski Thesis, LFM 2006 Page 93 of 103
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
25
20
15
Figure 9.3 P&G Stock History for the past 20 years (the S indicates a stock split) 42
Former P&G employee, George Fay, cashed in about half his holdings after he left the company
in 1995, but still held about 10,000 shares. However, his loyalty is evident in the following quote
"P&G got me here and I'm sticking with them," he said.43
Employees feel loyal to the company but expect strong leadership to drive success. They tend to
develop legends around their CEOs. It is common to walk through the halls of P&G and hear the
names "AG" and "Pepper" discussed. John Pepper was a beloved CEO and Chairman of the
Board of P&G in the late 1990s. He was replaced by Durk Jager upon retirement. However,
employees talk about how cold and unfriendly Mr. Jager appeared, and how he rode P&G stock
down through the crash mentioned above. Following this crash, Durk Jager resigned and the
current CEO, AG Lafley, was promoted to the job, before some people thought he was ready.
Mr. Pepper came out of retirement to chair the board again, and allow Lafley to focus on the
CEO job while Pepper ran interference for him with the board. This cemented John Pepper as a
hero in employees' eyes. The public certainly approved as the stock has recovered nicely since
then. After Pepper retired for the second time, Lafley instilled his own vision of building core
brands, designing the current organization, and focusing the organization on winning at the two
"moments of truth." This vision resonated with the employees and the "moments of truth" are
frequently referenced by employees.
A discussion of P&G culture would not be complete without mentioning the norms of behavior.
When it comes to meeting other employees, P&G uses the word, "join-up" to refer to the routine
of two colleagues spending an hour just getting to know each other. This is standard practice at
P&G, and one employee will send another an email, indicating that work may have them cross
paths, and request this informal 'join-up' before beginning any formal working partnership.
Norms stretch beyond introductions to communication at P&G. Templates exist for power-point
presentations, standard colors are laid out and rules about how the circles and colors can be
combined and used. P&G has a language all its own. So many acronyms and phrases are in use,
that P&G maintains a web dictionary of P&G terminology.
Lastly, the external community provided many clues to the P&G culture. Employing more than
13,000 employees in Ohio, P&G is a formidable part of the local community. Throughout my
42 P&G website C Thomson Financial
43 Coolidge, Alexander. "P&G stock floats near century mark" The Cincinnati Post. January 10, 2004.
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experience in Cincinnati, I learned the impression outsiders had of the organization. Locals saw
employees as very conservative and traditional, and nicknamed them Proctoids. At the same
time, there was significant respect for the company, and while some extremists believed some of
the behaviors mirrored a cult, overall people felt it was a successful company, a good neighbor
and an enviable place to work.
9.3.2 Impact of P&G Culture on Projects
Overall, the strong culture of the organization facilitated my internship. I have had a
longstanding, deep respect for P&G and was excited to experiment with becoming part of the
organization. My excitement was so visibly evident that people cautioned me about maintaining
my objectivity for the quality of research. However, the strong culture set me up as a natural,
"outsider on the inside."4 4 This enabled my objectivity despite my natural proclivity to fall-in
with the norms of the organization.
The existing norms did facilitate operating in the environment. With so many standards in place,
there were many presentation templates to copy from, clear expectations about the length,
number of bullets/slide that management would expect, etc. While I had to get used to P&G
vocabulary, once I was up to speed, it was very easy to be productive.
The join-up process facilitated relationship building early in my internship, which was the key to
the projects' success. My first day of work at P&G, I was given a list of over twenty names of
appropriate people that I should 'join-up' with. The personality of P&G ensured that these
people were all very open, eager to talk, and very helpful throughout the course of the project.
The skills and personality of people involved made it very easy to get work done.
9.4 Evaluation of Project Outcomes
In summary, the context of P&G provided factors which enabled project success. The strong
relationships between employees, and philosophy of hiring people who are friendly and
intelligent facilitated work. People were willing to support and help out where needed. While
some challenges from the organizational complexity made the statistical process more complex
for rolling out metrics, they were offset by the other factors.
These also highlighted a few organizational areas of importance to keep in consideration when
evaluating forecast accuracy at P&G. News travels fast through these organizations. Once a
prototype was shown to one of the regional managers, demand rose from the other regions. In
rolling out the new metric system, it was important to have the process tested and ready to
deploy early, and to keep key stakeholders updated. This also facilitated getting the new process
up and running quickly. While the project findings seemed readily accepted, this was the case
due to the relationships and support of key organizational players. Lastly, projects such as the
accountability metric setting will continue after the internship, and their long term success is
supported by the key organizational players who supported and drove the change.
44 Klein, Jan. True Change: How Outsiders on the Inside Get Things Done in Organizations Jossey Bass. 2004.
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10 Leadership Lessons
Having the context of the organization highlighted in Chapter 9, reflection on the organizational
context also revealed some personal leadership lessons gathered during the analysis.
10.1 Metric Setting
Creating metrics for which organizations feel accountable can be challenging. Several factors
appeared to be quite important in the implementation of the projects. Although the statistics for
generating appropriate metrics are important, maintaining a soft perspective and obtaining
support behind a deployment are also critical. It was clear that metrics perceived as arbitrary,
though numerically equal for all regions, were not supported or adhered to. The organization
believed that other factors intrinsically impacted accuracy and should be considered when
evaluating performance or setting metrics. Therefore, it is important to work within, or at least
understand, the organization's mental model to create functional metrics.
Another important consideration was balancing the priorities of people responsible for delivering
the objective. For example, discussions with various demand planners indicated that while they
were responsible for generating the forecast, they would have strong pressure to keep a forecast
high even as business began to slip, since adjusting the forecast downward would indicate that
the business was slipping and would draw unwanted attention to the business manager, and
might limit the resources available, often justified on growth forecasts.
Lastly, reiterating points made earlier in the paper, an effective goal needs to be stretch to create
motivation yet reasonable, so not to de-motivate. The following table demonstrates some of the
impacts on choosing a metric:
Global Error Tolerance (+l-)
Low (tight) <- --- - High (loose)
Finance (preference for smaller variability) +
Product Supply (inventory savings) +
CBD (effort required to improve forecasting) +
Cost (additional cost required to meet tolerance) +
Motivation and Business Buy-In (feasible but stretch) - + -
Realistic Target (probable to meet business +
requirement) I
Figure 10.1 Impact on choosing a forecast error tolerance.
Figure 10.1 shows directionally how different business areas and factors relate to potential
different tolerances. Finance prefers smaller forecast error, and thus a tighter tolerance, as long
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as this can be met. Product supply also favors a tighter forecast tolerance as this reduces the
inventory carried. CBD (consumer business development, a multi-functioning organization
which interfaces with the customer) prefers looser tolerances for meeting sales commitments. If
the company were to choose a tighter tolerance, then expectations would be set to invest in
programs to improve capability. Thus a tighter tolerance would have an additional cost to P&G
in terms of the investment required to increase capability. Motivation and business buy-in
require a feasible but stretch target. If the target is too easy the organization will not work to
meet it. If the target is too difficult, it will be ignored as it will be viewed as unachievable. Thus
the range needs to strike a balance between feasible, yet stretch to motivate personnel. Lastly,
business management requests a metric that they can expect to be delivered. This summarizes
considerations that need to be balanced in metric setting.
10.2 Consistency
When making change within an organization, consistency is critically important as people are
inclined to ignore requests or changes if they do not feel that they be lasting, or if they are in a
state of flux and are not yet settled. It is very common for people to wait to see how something
'settles out' before responding. Therefore, were we to change the target ranges for forecast
accuracy too frequently, people would cease to pay attention to them as they could argue that
they were always changing. We ran into a few issues with this as the initial set of data used to
perform the statistical analysis was based on June-May data, which is one month off from the
fiscal year cycle of July-June. This occurred since the analysis was begun before June data was
obtained. Expectations were for the statistical process to be complete before June data was
obtained, however this did not prove to be the case. When the question arose whether the global
metrics and tolerances should be re-generated with data that was one month more recent, this
concept of consistency was raised. Review of the changes to data that this would produce
indicated that it would be in the decimal places for the small percentage numbers, and the team
decided not to update the tolerances that had already been presented to senior management.
Consistency came into question again when developing the statistical process to determine
tolerance ranges, and the use of probabilities to determine capability. As discussed in section
6.4.6 Standard Deviation there were two options for standard deviation, and initially the "short-
term" standard deviation was chosen as this appeared to be more relevant for our predictive
needs. However, in reviewing the output and process with the North American Demand
Planning Manager, he noticed that the probability calculations did not appear to correlate with
the historical data displayed and none of the statistical explanations resonated with the data. It
became evident that the process should change and use the common definition of standard
deviation. So although the statistical process changed, the original tolerances calculated were
not updated as they had already been deployed throughout the organization. This produced some
questions later surrounding the probability number discrepancies between the original rollout,
and subsequent analysis, but these were handled as simply as possible.
10.3 Balancing Stakeholder Needs
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The accountability project was a practical lesson in understanding and balancing stakeholder
needs. Each of the parties involved had different priorities, and recognizing and accounting for
these issues allowed the project to proceed without significant delay. For example, some regions
were more concerned with monthly tolerance ranges as opposed to the corporate focus on rolling
quarterly tolerances. Some regional leads wanted to know the conversion from quarterly
tolerances to monthly tolerances. Others took the top-down metric at face value and were not
interested in understanding a monthly conversion. When these issues arose at the global
teleconference, they were discussed long enough to be understood. Subsequently, the interested
parties were identified and separate meetings were setup to be conducted offline from the global
group. This accounted for everyone's needs without slowing down the group's progress.
Another challenge in the accountability project was striking the balance between having a
statistically perfect model that would not present future issues and having the model rolled out
in a timely manner for the fiscal year with a consistent process that was easily bought into. The
business was persistent that they needed the metric immediately. Applying a metric after the
year had begun was far from optimal. Meanwhile, the statistical drive for perfection was causing
model development to take much longer than anticipated. Finally, the needs of the business for
speed and consistency overcame the desire for perfection and a less than perfect was deployed.
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11 Conclusions
The final chapter will summarize the key lessons and applications stemming from this thesis
research. It presents the author's opinion on the P&G demand planning process and key lessons
which can be applied to other areas, or companies based on this research.
11.1 P&G Demand Planning Process Comments
P&G has implemented a world class business process in their demand planning organization.
Many factors point to the strengths of the demand planning organization and display evidence of
its success. Consistency across businesses and regions allows for speed in introducing process
improvements globally. A team of global experts constantly innovates to ensure that the best
processes for P&G are in place and to plan new advances for the future. The most common
discussed impacts of forecast accuracy include inventory and customer service. Benchmarking
analysis conducted by another intern indicated that P&G performs very well in these areas,
indicating that it would be logical for their forecast process to additionally perform well relative
to competition.
The downside of having a common global process for demand planning is that it may not be
optimized for local requirements or business needs. Analysis at the SKU level indicated that
using a moving average as a benchmark forecast, some SKUs were much better than the moving
average, while others were much worse. This seems to indicate that different levels of attention
would produce a more level result.
Additionally, another concern is that with such a developed demand planning process the
opportunities for further improvement may be costly. In fact, improvements achieved may not
justify the additional cost to improve the processes. This was demonstrated in the RR project
analysis.
11.2 Key Applications
My thesis research led to a few key lessons which can be applied to other areas. Review of the
importance of forecast accuracy for P&G indicated that in general, forecasts can have a major
impact on many areas of the business. Thus, forecasts should still be regarded as critically
important to other organizations. Even companies which produce to order need to have an idea
of forecast demand to be able to operate effectively. These companies will still need to maintain
relationships with their suppliers, ensure they have adequate capital assets to provide sufficient
capacity, and provide accurate financial projections to Wall Street to be viewed successful.
While this research demonstrated the importance of forecast accuracy, it also revealed how
challenging demand planning may be in an organization as the inputs and outputs from the
process come from many different parts of the company. The motivations behind all the parties
providing input data to the forecast decision can have a major impact on accuracy. Additionally,
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the costs of forecast error are widespread throughout the organization. However, the cost of
demand planning may not be aligned with the cost of the output, thus organizational challenges
can arise quickly.
A number of general lessons applying to evaluating forecast accuracy were also evident.
Evaluating forecast accuracy can be challenging as many companies and businesses have
different processes for measuring accuracy. Even P&G and Gillette had very different metrics.
Therefore, it is important to consider what is appropriate when determining how to measure
accuracy. For example, choosing appropriate time buckets, forecast horizons, and deciding how
to incorporate bias into the error measurement are all important decisions. In the course of this
research, measurement techniques were matched up with the largest expected impact of forecast
accuracy. As the RR project was expected to provide inventory savings, the forecast accuracy
term in the algorithm to calculate inventory was the appropriate metric for accuracy.
When implementing metrics, or even performing an analysis on an organization, the analysis
itself can drive behavior. Therefore, considering the interactions in the system is also important
when designing a forecast accuracy analysis. For example, the three-month rolling data for one
of P&G's geographic regions showed consistent fluctuation from over-predicting to under-
predicting demand. As these are three-month rolling averages, it was clear that the one month
averages must be largely over- or under- the forecast to be able to swing the data points so
widely each month. This indicates that the one-month forecasts were highly likely to be much
more erroneous than the three-month forecast to ensure that bias is eliminated. So while this
region may perform well according to the three-month forecasts, the one-month forecasts are
abnormally poor.
A few themes seemed to run through multiple projects. Manual adjustments to statistical or
computer generated forecasts are not always efficient. In both the RR project and efficiency
evaluation, evidence was shown that cases exist where forecasts were better without manual
adjustment. Additionally, these projects indicated that improvements in forecast accuracy may
not be easy and the point of diminishing returns may have been met as it becomes prohibitively
costly to achieve significant improvement. The use of much more granular and detailed data did
not produce significant accuracy improvements. Additionally, events seem to be the major
contributor to forecast error, and can distort standard principles. For example, larger shipments
do not show a strong correlation to lower error as one would expect from aggregation. Thus with
the concern about reaching diminishing returns, focus on improving event forecasts is the area
demanding attention as improving turn forecasts will have negligible impact until event forecasts
are improved.
Lastly, the concept of taking a global or corporate target and breaking it down to component
targets for individual units based on statistics can be applied to areas other than demand planning.
This process seems novel and could be extrapolated beyond forecasting.
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